Duquesne Law Review
Volume 53
Number 2 A Tribute to Chief Justice Ronald D.
Castille and State Constitutional Law

Article 11

2015

Thirty Years Too Long Why the Michigan v. Long Presumption
Should Be Rejected, and What Can Be Done to Replace It
Lauren Gailey

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lauren Gailey, Thirty Years Too Long Why the Michigan v. Long Presumption Should Be Rejected, and
What Can Be Done to Replace It, 53 Duq. L. Rev. 485 (2015).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol53/iss2/11

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Thirty Years Too Long: Why the Michigan v. Long
Presumption Should Be Rejected, and What Can Be
Done To Replace It
Lauren Gailey, Esq.*
I.

II.

INTRODUCTION: THE CASE AGAINST LONG .......................
THE ROAD TO LONG ..........................................................

485
489

A.

489

B.

C.
III.

E arly Cases...........................................................
1.
The Origins of Supreme Court Review
of State High Court Cases ........................
2.
The Presumptionagainst Reviewing
State D ecisions..........................................
U.S. Supreme Court Review of State High
Court Cases: A Delicate Balance..........................
1.
The "Adequateand Independent State
Grounds" Doctrine ....................................
2.
The Court Finds a "Middle Ground"
in the Decisions of the Mid-Twentieth
C entu ry .....................................................
The Long Presumption.........................................

THE FAILURE OF LONG .....................................................

A.

The Problem: The Failingsof the Long
P resump tion .........................................................
1.
The United States Supreme Court Itself
Has Questioned the Wisdom of Long ........
a.
The D issents ..................................
b.
The Bush v. Gore Controversy:
A Vote of No Confidence in Long ..

489
492
493
493

49 7
501
505

505
505
505
510

* J.D., Duquesne University School of Law, 2014. The author is an associate in Jones
Day's Pittsburgh office. The opinions discussed in this article are solely those of the author
and do not express the opinions of Jones Day or of its clients. The author extends her deepest
thanks to Dean Ken Gormley for his invaluable guidance, insight, and comments on earlier
drafts, as well as for inspiring her interest in state constitutional law (and the topic of this
article). She would also like to thank Lee DeJulius, Jr., Esq., for his encouragement and
assistance, and Adam Petrun, Esq., for his exceptional mentorship.

484

Duquesne Law Review
2.

B.

Vol. 53

State High Courts Have Evidenced
Distaste for Long, thus Frustratingthe
"Adequate and Independent State
Grounds" Doctrine .................................... 513
a.
Com ity ........................................... 514
i. Permits the U.S. Supreme
Court To Critique State High
Courts' Opinions...................... 514
ii. Pressures State High Courts
To Change Their Minds on
R emand ................................... 515
iii. The Plain Statement Rule
Fails To Address Long's
Comity Implications................
517
iv. The State High Courts'
Hostile Reactions to Long ........
519
v. Long's Potential To
Undermine the U.S. Supreme
Court's Authority ..................... 521
b.
Jurisdiction................................... 523
i. In the Majority of Cases
Remanded under Long,
State High Courts Reach
the Same Result ....................... 523
ii. The Plain Statement Rule
Has Proven Ineffective .............
529
c.
Judicial Economy .......................... 531
The Solution: Abandon the Long Presumption
in Favor of the "Modern Federalism"Approach.. 534
1.
The U.S. Supreme Court's Role:
O verturn Long .......................................... 535
a.
Presume State High Court Cases
Rest upon Adequate and
Independent State Grounds ..........
536
b.
Include a Disclaimer in Denials
of Certiorarion Adequate and
Independent State Grounds ..........
538
2.
The State High Courts'Role:Adopt the
'Modern Federalism"Approach...............
542
a.
The Theoretical Ideal: The
Primacy Principle......................... 543
b.
'Modern Federalism" A
Workable Solution......................... 547

Summer 2015

Thirty Years Too Long
i.

IV .

Order of Analysis: State
Issues First, Where
Practicable............................... 549
ii. Encourage State
ConstitutionalAnalysis in
Litigants'Briefing................... 551
C ON CLU SION .................................................................... 557

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE CASE AGAINST LONG

When Michigan v. Long1 celebrated its thirtieth birthday in 2013,
the occasion warranted little celebration. Over the course of the
three decades since the United States Supreme Court established
the presumption that federal law controls in state high court cases
involving a mix of federal- and state-law grounds for decision, thus
giving the Court jurisdiction to review the state high courts' decisions, 2 the Long framework has proven to be controversial at best,
and unwieldy and ineffectual at worst. This article argues that the
Long presumption should be rejected.
Several lines of reasoning support this conclusion. First, the vast
majority of the long history of the Court's approach to reviewing the
decisions of state high courts has been marked by deference to those
courts; its current aggressive approach to reviewing the decisions
of state high courts is a relatively recent development. Second, the
Court itself has demonstrated some reservations as to the wisdom
of Long. Members of the Court have, at times, expressed their
doubts directly, as in the well-reasoned dissents of Justices John
Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 3 The Court has also impliedly evinced a distrust of the Long presumption on a particularly
consequential and high-profile occasion. In the first 4 of the series
1. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
2. In Michigan u. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Court revolutionized its approach to
evaluating whether it had jurisdiction to review ambiguously grounded state high court cases
by setting forth the following presumption:
[Ifn determining, as we must, whether we have jurisdiction to review a case that is
alleged to rest on adequate and independent state grounds, we merely assume that
there are no such grounds when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state
court relied upon an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal law.
Id. at 1042 (internal citation omitted). The rationale underlying the holdings of Long will be
discussed in much greater detail in Part II.C, infra.
3. See, e.g., Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 64-76 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23-34 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
475 U.S. 673, 689-708 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4. Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd. (Bush 1), 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam).
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of cases leading up to its Bush v. Gore5 decision, which could arguably have determined the outcome of the 2000 presidential election,
the Court quietly departed from the Long presumption, instead resuscitating an earlier approach to ambiguously grounded cases and
remanding the case to the Florida Supreme Court for clarification
as to the basis for its decision. Given the critical importance of the
situation, the Court's decision not to rely on Long under the circumstances can be viewed as a symbolic "vote of no confidence."
Not surprisingly, the state high courts whose decisions are presumed to be subject to U.S. Supreme Court review have been more
forthright in expressing their distaste for Long. The tendency of
Long to either dampen or neutralize entirely the benefits of the "adequate and independent state grounds doctrine"-fostering comity,
keeping the courts operating within their proper jurisdictional bases, and promoting judicial efficiency-explains why this is so.
Long creates comity problems because it gives the U.S. Supreme
Court the opportunity to critique and second-guess state high
courts' decisions. It has even been speculated from time to time
that the very act of granting certiorari, vacating a state court's decision without opinion, and remanding the case is an implicit signal
on the part of the U.S. Supreme Court that it did not like the direction in which the state court had taken the case, and that the state
court ought to reverse itself on remand. This, of course, is not the
Court's proper role.
Instead of preventing problems like these, Long's "plain statement" rule, which requires state courts to explicitly state that their
decisions rest upon adequate and independent state grounds if they
wish to avoid Supreme Court review,6 has exacerbated the resentment that state courts have at times expressed in reaction to a vacatur or reversal. Some state courts have adopted sarcastic or hostile tones in their "plain statements," and the New Hampshire Supreme Court even attempted to issue a "blanket disclaimer" intended to shield its ambiguously grounded cases from Supreme
Court review in perpetuity, whether they include a thorough, goodfaith state-law analysis or not.7 This hostility and passive aggression is not limited to the "plain statement" rule, however. State
high courts have on multiple occasions expressed anger or dissatisfaction at what they perceive as the Court's incursion into their territory. If this type of enmity continues to build, and if state high

5.
6.
7.

531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
Long, 463 U.S. at 1043-44.
State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 352 (N.H. 1983).
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courts protect their sovereignty and take stands on principle by refusing to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's instructions on remand,
the latter Court's authority could be undermined and its standing
in the American system of government permanently compromised.
After all, "the Supreme Court has no army or police force with which
to enforce its decisions. '8 It is, therefore, only as good as its word.
Even more troubling than these comity problems are the jurisdictional implications of Long. The state courts whose state constitutional decisions the U.S. Supreme Court reviews almost invariably
reach the exact same decision on remand, rendering the Court's decisions in such cases advisory in the sense that they had no effect
on the ultimate outcome of the case. A twenty-year retrospective
study conducted in 2003 revealed that in more than half of the cases
reviewed pursuant to Long, the state high court either reached the
same result on remand or reached the same result as the U.S. Supreme Court by coincidence. 9 A 2013 study conducted for the purposes of this article revealed that the jurisdictional effects of Long
were even more pronounced at the thirty-year mark than they were
a decade ago. The state courts reached the same result on remand
with respect to at least some issues-thus rendering the U.S. Supreme Court's opinions advisory to some degree-in seven of eleven
cases. 10 In fact, the only cases in which the outcomes were affected
were cases in which the state court interpreted the state's constitution in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of
the federal Constitution-cases the Court should have jurisdiction
to review due to the close link to federal law."
The issuance of advisory opinions also frustrates the third benefit
of the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, judicial
economy. For example, assuming each of the seven advisory opinions discussed above required the U.S. Supreme Court and the state
high court on remand to spend one month each deciding the case
and generating an opinion, fourteen months' worth of man-hours
and other resources-well over a year-were allocated toward cases
that never should have been reviewed or remanded in the first
place.
Again, Long's plain statement rule has done nothing to remedy
these problems. The state courts frequently ignore the requirement

8.

ROBERT GARNER, PETER FERDINAND, & STEPHANIE LAWSON, INTRODUCTION TO

POLITICS 49 Box 2.1 (2012).
9. Matthew G. Simon, Note, Revisiting Michigan v. Long after Twenty Years, 66 ALB. L.
REV. 969, 982-84 (2003).
10. See infra Part III.A.2.b.i.
11. See infra Part III.A.2.b.i.
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entirely, forget about it, or bury it in a footnote of a long and complex opinion. In other cases, it is so difficult to determine whether
a particular phrase in the state court's opinion constitutes the requisite "plain statement" for the purposes of Long that it is doubtful
whether it is sufficiently "plain" at all. Even worse is the possibility, realized in one recent case, 12 that the U.S. Supreme Court will
recognize the plain statement, but reject it and review the case anyway.
These unintended consequences of Long thus frustrate its stated
goals by increasing inefficiency in the court system, endangering
comity between the federal and state courts, and stretching the jurisdiction of the Court dangerously close to its bounds. In order to
resolve these issues or, better yet, avoid them entirely, it is time for
the Court to abandon Long. Instead, it should err on the side of
caution and presume that it lacks jurisdiction to review the decision
of a state court of last resort that relies on a mixture of state and
federal law grounds. The Court should return to its earliest approach to such cases: 13 where it is unclear whether a state high
court case was decided on state or federal constitutional grounds,
the Court should presume that the case was decided on state
grounds and decline to hear the case for lack of jurisdiction.
This does not mean, however, that the Court must return to the
laissez-faire approach that allowed state courts' erroneous interpretations of federal law to remain uncorrected and ultimately led it to
adopt the Long presumption. In order to prevent this and preserve
the uniformity of the body of federal jurisprudence for which it has
the ultimate responsibility, the Court should include a disclaimer
in its denial of certiorari that states that it lacks jurisdiction based
upon the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, and
that the state high court's opinion is not precedential to the extent
that its decision rests upon federal law.1 4 This disclaimer intends
no disrespect toward the state courts and makes no new law. Rather, it simply reminds practitioners who encounter that state high
court decision of a principle of federalism that is beyond dispute:
the state high courts are the ultimate arbiters of state law, while
the United States Supreme Court has the ultimate authority to interpret federal law.
In order to ensure the success of this effort, state high courts
should adopt "modern federalism," proposed for the first time in this
12.
13.
sota v.
14.

Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 502 (2012) (per curiam).
See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207 (1904); MinneN. Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904); King Bridge Co. v. Otoe Cnty., 120 U.S. 225 (1887).
See infra Part JJJ.B.1.b.
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article, as their preferred approach to the state constitutional decision-making process. Modern federalism requires state high courts
to make the effort, to the extent that their schedules and resources
allow, to conduct an independent state constitutional analysis in
good faith before analyzing any federal issues that might be necessary to resolve the case. The state high courts should also keep
their state and federal analyses separate, preferably by placing
each in its own respective portion of the opinion. In order to promote long-term compliance, the state high court should propose and
strongly encourage litigants to use a standardized analytical framework 15 that mirrors the court's order of analysis. Litigants should
follow this framework as they brief state constitutional issues,
which would in turn help to keep the state and federal issues distinct and conserve time and judicial resources by supplying the
court with the "raw materials" it needs to produce a thorough state
constitutional analysis.
II.

A.

THE ROAD TO LONG

Early Cases
1.

The Originsof Supreme Court Review of State High
Court Cases

In order to understand the significance of Michigan v. Long-and
to properly comprehend how far the United States Supreme Court
has strayed from its previous approaches to reviewing the decisions
of state courts of last resort-it is necessary to place Long into
proper historical context. It is helpful to begin, as it is often said,
at the very beginning, with the seminal decision that serves as the
source of much of the United State Supreme Court's power. In Marbury v. Madison,16 the Court interpreted Article III of the United
States Constitution as establishing the power of judicial review,
that is, the courts' authority to invalidate acts of Congress by de1 7
claring them unconstitutional.

15. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's framework for state constitutional
analysis was announced in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991). Edmunds will be discussed in greater detail infra Part III.B.2.b.ii.
16. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
17. See id. at 173-80. Specifically, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in an oft-quoted passage:
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of
every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the con-
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While Marbury established judicial review in a general sense, the
contours of the courts' authority would be delineated over the
course of the next two decades.1 8 In 1816, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee1 9 marked the Court's first opportunity to explore the boundaries
of the United States Supreme Court's relationship to its state counterparts. The facts of Martin involved a dispute over a tract of land
in Virginia called the Northern Neck, which an English nobleman,
Lord Thomas Fairfax, purportedly devised in his will to a nephew,
British citizen Denny Fairfax, before the Revolutionary War. 20 After the Revolution, the Commonwealth of Virginia commenced an
action in ejectment to confiscate the land from Denny Fairfax pursuant to legislation it had enacted during the war that allowed it to
21
confiscate property owned by Loyalists.
The Virginia Supreme Court initially upheld the confiscation on
the grounds that the Peace Treaty between the United States and
England did not control the outcome of the dispute over the Northern Neck. 22 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the treaty did, in fact, apply, and remanded the case to the
Virginia Supreme Court.2 3 On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court
reaffirmed its original decision, reasoning that the United States
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to review the decisions of state
high courts. 24 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the

stitution, is void. ... It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule.
Id. at 177. The importance of judicial review cannot be overstated. 'The Supreme Court is
often said to be the most powerful arm of the American political system because of its established right (of judicial review) to declare actions of the executive and legislative branches as
unconstitutional." GARNER ET AL., supranote 8, at 49 Box 2.1.
18. The debate over the breadth of Article III began much earlier, however, dating back
to the founding of the nation. George Mason, for example, feared that "the judiciary of the
United States is so constructed and extended as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the
several States." George Mason, 3 ELLIOT, Debs. at 475. Addressing the Virginia ratifying
convention in 1788, Mason cautioned that there was no "limitation whatever with respect to
the nature or jurisdiction of [the federal] courts." George Mason, Speech at the Virginia
Ratifying Convention (June 19, 1788). The Federalists, including John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison, responded to the fears of Mason and his anti-Federalist brethren
by assuring them that "the action of the State courts could [not] be revised by the judiciary
department, except on questions purely Federal." Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590,
609 (1874).
19. 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
20. Id. at 307-09, 311.
21. Id. at 309-12.
22. Hunter v. Fairfax's Devisee, 15 Va. 218, 238 (1810), rev'd sub nom. Fairfax's Devisee
v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. 603 (1812).
23. Fairfax'sDevisee, 11 U.S. at 605-08.
24. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 58-59 (1815), rev'd sub nom. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. 304 (1816). The Supreme Court of Virginia explained:
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Court again reversed the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court. 25
In an opinion authored by Justice Story, the Court held that the
United States Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction extended to
cases originating in state courts. 26 In establishing judicial review
by the United States Supreme Court over state court decisions, the
Court made clear that the fundamental assumption underlying the
new American system of government-that the federal system requires the states to cede some degree of their autonomy to the federal government-extended to the judiciary. 27 In a particularly elegant passage, Justice Story wrote:
Such is the language of the article creating and defining the
judicial power of the United States [Article III]. It is the voice
of the whole American people solemnly declared, in establishing one great department of that government which was, in
many respects, national, and in all, supreme. It is a part of the
very same instrument which was to act not merely upon individuals, but upon states; and to deprive them altogether of the
exercise of some powers of sovereignty, and to restrain and reg28
ulate them in the exercise of others.
The United States Supreme Court thus declared its own supremacy over its state counterparts with respect to matters of federal
29
constitutional interpretation.

The court is unanimously of opinion, that the appellate power of the Supreme Court of
the United States, does not extend to this court, under a sound construction of the
constitution of the United States;-that so much of the 25th section of the act of congress, to establish the judicial courts of the United States [commonly known as the
Judiciary Act of 1789], as extends the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
this court, is not in pursuance of the constitution of the United States; that the writ of
error in this case was improvidently allowed under the authority of that act; that the
proceedings thereon in the Supreme Court were coram non judice in relation to this
court; and that obedience to its mandate be declined by this court.
Id.
25. Martin, 14 U.S. at 362. The Court ultimately held the confiscation of the Northern
Neck property impermissible and ruled that aliens (here, Denny Fairfax) were permitted to
inherit land in Virginia. Id.
26. Id. at 342 (opinion of the Court, per Story, J.) ("It would seem to follow that the appellate power of the United States must, in such cases, extend to state tribunals .... ").
27. Id. at 343 ("It is a mistake that the constitution was not designed to operate upon
states, in their corporate capacities. It is crowded with provisions which restrain or annul
the sovereignty of the states in some of the highest branches of their prerogatives.").
28. Id. at 328.
29. To be precise, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee established United States Supreme Court
review over state high courts' decisions with respect to federal law in civil matters. Five
years later in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821), the Court held that state courts' criminal law decisions involving federal law are reviewable by the federal courts.
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The Presumption againstReviewing State Decisions

Even though the Court established its authority to review the decisions of state high courts early in the nation's history, it exercised
that power with great restraint for more than a century afterward.
In a general sense, the Court advocated that the federal courts exercise their limited jurisdiction sparingly. 30 In the 1887 case of King
Iron Bridge & Manufacturing Co. v. Otoe County,3 1 for example, the
Court recognized the presumption that a federal court lacks jurisdiction over a state court's decision unless "the contrary appears
affirmatively from the record. '32 For this proposition the Court
cited Mansfield, C. & L. M. Railway v. Swan, 33 which explained:
[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial
power of the United States, is inflexible and without exception
which requires this court, of its own motion, to deny its own
jurisdiction, and, in the exercise of its appellate power, that of
all other courts of the United States, in all cases where such
jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record on
which, in the exercise of that power, it is called to act. On every
writ of error or appeal the first and fundamental question is
that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court
34
from which the record comes.
King Iron Bridge and Mansfield were neither the first nor the last
cases of their kind. In many other instances, the Court's default
presumption was to assume, in cases where the basis for its jurisdiction was not apparent, that it lacked jurisdiction over the mat3
ter. 5
30. For a discussion of the jurisdictional limitations of the federal courts that spring from
the text and interpretation of Article III of the U.S. Constitution, see infra Part III.A.1.
31. 120 U.S. 225 (1887).
32. Id. at 226.
33. 111 U.S. 379 (1884).
34. Id. at 382.
35. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207, 218 (1904)
("The presumption is that a cause is without the jurisdiction of a circuit court of the United
States unless the contrary affirmatively and distinctly appears."); Minnesota v. N. Sec. Co.,
194 U.S. 48, 62-63 (1904) (requiring an affirmative showing of jurisdiction); Bors v. Preston,
111 U.S. 252, 255 (1884) ("[B]ecause the courts of the Union, being courts of limited jurisdiction, the presumtion, [sic] in every stage of the cause, is that it is without their jurisdiction,
unless the contrary appears from the record."); Grace v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 283
(1883) ("As the jurisdiction of the circuit court is limited, in the sense that it has no other
jurisdiction than that conferred by the constitution and laws of the United States, the presumption is that a cause is without its jurisdiction unless the contrary affirmatively appears."); Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 649 (1878) (explaining that "the presumption now
...isH that a cause is without [the Circuit Court's] jurisdiction unless the contrary affirmatively appears").
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U.S. Supreme Court Review of State High Court Cases: A
Delicate Balance
1.

The "Adequateand Independent State Grounds"Doctrine

Despite this apparently well-settled presumption against assuming jurisdiction, a recurring problem arose in many cases in which
federal courts were called upon to review the decisions of state
courts. Because by their very natures these cases often involved a
mix of federal law and state law, the "affirmative" basis of jurisdiction the Court required in cases such as King Iron Bridge and Mansfield was often difficult to pinpoint. In order to determine whether
they had jurisdiction to review state cases, federal courts first had
to decide a threshold question: whether the state courts' decisions
relied on federal law, state law, or both.
The United States Supreme Court attempted to resolve this issue
in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 36 which set forth a list of requirements that had to be satisfied before it could review the decision of
a state high court and provided a framework for reviewing state
issues once jurisdiction was established. 37 The Murdock Court, recognizing that the decisions of state courts rest at various times on
federal, state, or an ambiguous combination of grounds, 38 produced
no less than seven holdings to guide the Supreme Court's approach
to these cases. 39 The first three established prerequisites that a
case must meet if the Court is to take jurisdiction. 40 First, for the
state court decision to be reviewable, it had to involve a federal
question. 41 Second, the state court had to have decided that federal
issue. 42 Third, the petitioner must have presented an actual grievance. 43 Fourth, if those three prerequisites were met, the Court had
44
jurisdiction.

36. 87 U.S. 590 (1874).
37. Id. at 593, 635-36.
38. See id. at 634 ("It often has occurred, however, and will occur again, that there are
other points in the case than those of Federal cognizance, on which the judgment of the court
below may stand; those points being of themselves sufficient to control the case. Or it may
be, that there are other issues in the case, but they are not of such controlling influence on
the whole case that they are alone sufficient to support the judgment. It may also be found
that notwithstanding there are many other questions in the record of the case, the issue
raised by the Federal question is such that its decision must dispose of the whole case.").
39. Id. at 635-36.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 636.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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Once jurisdiction was established, Murdock's remaining holdings
provided a procedure for how the Court was required to review the
state court's decision. 45 The fifth mandated that if the decision of
the state court was correct, the United States Supreme Court was
required to affirm it.46 It was the final two holdings, however, that
would give Murdock its landmark status. In the sixth, the Court
made clear that, where the decision of the state high court rested
on a mix of state and federal grounds for decision, the Supreme
Court had to look for a state-law issue that would be sufficient in
and of itself to dispose of the case. 47 Seventh, if federal law formed
the predominant basis for the state high court's decision, the United
States Supreme Court possessed jurisdiction to review it.48
With its sixth holding, the Murdock Court ushered in the era of
the "adequate and independent state grounds" doctrine. 49 Ken
Gormley, now Dean of the Duquesne University School of Law, explains that, "[b]oiled down to its simplest form, the adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine simply dictates 'when and how'
the United States Supreme Court can review decisions of the highest state courts. '' 50 The essence of the doctrine lies in the Murdock
Court's then-novel pronouncement that it would decline to review a
state high court's judgment when the state-law issue "is sufficiently
broad to maintain the judgment of that court"-that is, when the
judgment rests upon state grounds that are both adequate and independent.51 The term "adequate" referred to the ability of the decision "to stand on its own four legs-the state ground standing by
itself had to be sufficient to sustain the decision. ' ' 5 2 "Independent"
in this context "meant that the state ground in question had to possess a life of its own" and did not depend on federal law. 53 At its
heart, the significance of the adequate and independent state
grounds doctrine is this: "The power to review decisions is ultimately the power to overturn those decisions." 54 With respect to
state high courts' state-law pronouncements, particularly in the
state constitutional law context, the adequate and independent

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Ken Gormley, State Constitutions and CriminalProcedure:A Primerfor the 21st
Century, 67 OR. L. REV. 689, 699 (1988) [hereinafter Gormley, Primer].
50. Id.
51. See Murdock, 87 U.S. at 636.
52. Gormley, Primer, supra note 49, at 699.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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state grounds doctrine can effectively shield state high court decisions grounded in state law from review by the federal courts, "thus
allowing [their state constitutional decisions] to exist in separate
''55
pockets without the intrusion of the U.S. Supreme Court.
56
Dean Gormley has identified three advantages of the doctrine.
First, it encourages judicial economy by preventing the "improvident use of the U.S. Supreme Court's precious resources," which
would be wasted by reviewing state high court decisions that are
already sufficiently supported by state law. 5 7 Second, for the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to defer to their state counterparts
on matters of state law and policy over which the latter have authority and expertise encourages comity, the mutual respect and
goodwill that the sovereign state and federal courts owe one another. 58 Third, and most importantly, the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine "serves the paramount purpose of ensuring that the U.S. Supreme Court does not overstep its own sensitive
bounds of jurisdiction. ''59 Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution 60 forbids the Court from issuing advisory opinions that do not
affect the outcome of a case.6 1 If the Court was to review a state
high court decision supported by adequate and independent state
55. Id. Murdock's sixth holding stands for the proposition that a state high court decision
supported by adequate and independent state grounds must be affirmed, even if the court
decided an accompanying federal issue incorrectly. Murdock, 87 U.S. at 636 (holding that an
adequate and independent state ground will suffice to support a state high court decision
"notwithstanding the error in deciding the issue raised by the Federal question. If this is
found to be the case, the judgment must be affirmed without inquiring into the soundness of
the decision on such other matter or issue."); see also text accompanying supranote 47.
56. Gormley, Primer,supra note 49, at 699-700. Dean Gormley has described the reasoning underlying Murdock as "sensible." Id.
57. Id. at 699 & n.30.
58. Id. at 699 & n.31.
59. Id. at 699-700.
60. Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or
more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of
different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
61. See Gormley, Primer, supra note 49, at 700. The Court itself is well aware that the
'judicial Power' is one to render dispositive judgments," not advisory opinions. Camreta v.
Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2037-38 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995)). This limitation is grounded in Article III's Case
or Controversy requirement. See id. at 2028 (majority opinion) ("Article III of the Constitution grants this Court authority to adjudicate legal disputes only in the context of 'Cases' or
'Controversies."'); see also supra note 60.
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grounds for the purpose of re-examining it under federal law, its
opinion would be purely academic-and thus outside the bounds of
the Court's jurisdiction as conferred by Article III, Section 2.62 Beginning with Murdock, the United States Supreme Court thus declined to review state cases resting upon adequate and independent
state grounds in order to maintain and respect the "partitioning of
power between the state and federal judicial systems and .

.

. the

6' 3
limitations of [its] own jurisdiction.
For the first fifty years after the Court instituted the adequate
and independent state grounds doctrine in Murdock, it adopted a
very deferential approach to reviewing the decisions of state courts.
64
Consistent with its prevailing approach to jurisdiction generally,
the United States Supreme Court declined to review state high
court decisions that rested upon an inextricable mix of state and
federal law grounds.6 5 In the 1934 case of Lynch v. People of New
6 6 Chief Justice Hughes explained the Court's
York ex rel. Pierson,
inclination against assuming jurisdiction in ambiguously grounded
cases:

It is essential to the jurisdiction of this Court in reviewing a
decision of a court of a state that it must appear affirmatively
from the record, not only that a federal question was presented
for decision to the highest court of the state having jurisdiction,
but that its decision of the federal question was necessary to
the determination of the cause, and that it was actually decided
or that the judgment as rendered could not have been given
without deciding it. . . . Where the judgment of the state court

rests on two grounds, one involving a federal question and the
other not, or if it does not appear upon which of two grounds
the judgment was based, and the ground independent of a federal question is sufficient in itself to sustain it, this Court will
67
not take jurisdiction.
According to Dean Gormley, in ambiguously grounded cases
"[w]here the highest state courts issued opinions which jumbled together citations to federal and state law, the U.S. Supreme Court

62. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21 (1994) (explaining
that a "federal court [may not] decide the merits of a legal question not posed in an Article
III case or controversy").
63. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
64. See supra Part II.A.2.
65. See Gormley, Primer,supra note 49, at 700.
66. 293 U.S. 52 (1934).
67. Id. at 54-55.
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essentially presumed they rested upon some adequate, independent
68
state ground, and declined to interfere."
That presumption was not infallible, however. The major drawback to such a "laissez-faire" approach was that, in the name of affording state courts the maximum amount of deference to shape
their own laws, it had the potential to allow erroneous state interpretations of federal law to persist. The Court has acknowledged
that its "only power over state judgments is to correct them to the
extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights";6 9 if the Court
chooses not to exercise that power, it follows that any such incorrect
state court judgments will remain uncorrected.
2.

The Court Finds a "Middle Ground" in the Decisions of
the Mid-Twentieth Century

As the mid-twentieth century neared, the general trend of deference toward state courts began to wane. 70 In the 1940s and 1950s,
a new trend emerged: when the Supreme Court confronted a state
high court case that was ambiguously grounded in a mixture of
state and federal law, the Court began to seek clarification from the
state court as to the precise grounds upon which its decision
rested. 71 The Court employed two different means of clarification,
each introduced in a seminal case.
The first of these cases was Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 72 in
which the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to review a Minnesota
Supreme Court decision striking down a controversial progressive
chain store tax, which taxed stores earning greater sales revenues
at higher rates. 73 The Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion referred
to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution and article 9, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution 74 and included a general discussion of the Minnesota Constitution and three Minnesota cases, a discussion of several federal
75
cases, and, finally, a discussion of state cases citing federal law.
The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded by stating:

68. See Gormley, Primer,supra note 49, at 700 (emphasis added).
69. Herb, 324 U.S. at 125-26.
70. Gormley, Primer, supra note 49, at 700.
71. Id.
72. 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
73. Id. at 550-52.
74. Article 9, section 1 (currently article 10, section 1), a uniformity clause, provides that
"[t]axes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects .... " MINN. CONST. art. 10, § 1.
75. Nat'l Tea Co. v. State, 286 N.W. 360 (Minn. 1939), vacated sub nom. Minnesota v.
Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
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We think the five [federal] cases to which we have referred
have so definitely and finally disposed of the legal problem presented as to make it needless for us to analyze or discuss the
great number of other tax cases where the same constitutional
question was involved. These being the only cases to which our
attention has been called directly deciding the question presented, we are of opinion that we should follow them and that
76
it is our duty so to do.
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that in cases
where "there is considerable uncertainty as to the precise grounds
for the decision," it was free to decline to pass upon the federal issues involved in the case, but it did not automatically do so. 77 Instead, the Court balanced its authority to correct errors of law and
to dispose of cases in a just fashion with the "fundamental" need to
leave state courts "free and unfettered by us in interpreting their
state constitutions. "' 7 8 The Court ultimately held that, because
"[i]ntelligent exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask for
the elimination of the obscurities and ambiguities from the opinions
in such cases," the best course of action where the grounds for the
decision of the state high court were unclear was to vacate the state
high court's decision and remand the case to that court for clarification as to whether the state court had decided the case on adequate and independent state grounds. 79 Remanding cases in order
to give state courts an opportunity to clarify ambiguous grounds

76. Nat'l Tea, 309 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added) (citing Nat'l Tea Co. v. State, 286 N.W.
360, 364 (Minn. 1939)).
77. Id. at 555.
78. Id. at 555, 557.
79. Id. at 557-58. Not surprisingly, on remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified
that its prior decision did, in fact, rest upon adequate state grounds, and it reinstated its
former opinion in the case. Nat'l Tea Co. v. State, 294 N.W. 230, 231 (Minn. 1940) (per curiam) ("Having so re-examined them we conclude that our prior decision was right. There is
no need of further discussion of the problems presented for the former opinion adequately
covers the ground."). The Minnesota Supreme Court praised the U.S. Supreme Court's three
dissenters in the case for correctly recognizing that its decision rested upon adequate and
independent state grounds. Id. at 230.
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thus became the Court's first "middle ground" approach to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over state high court cases80 as the "adequate and independent state grounds doctrine budged towards the
81
center in the middle of the last century.
The United States Supreme Court instituted the second "middle
ground" approach in Herb v. Pitcairn,2 which continued the trend
in the 1940s and 1950s of seeking clarification from the state high
court, this time by certifying a question. In Herb, the United States
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Illinois Supreme
Court erred in affirming the dismissal of a railroad switchman's tort
claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.8 3 The Illinois Supreme Court's opinion included both federal and state precedent
dealing with the procedural issue.8 4 Cognizant of the state high
court's ambiguous grounds for decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
proceeded with caution, explaining that "if the same judgment
would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of
federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion. '8 5 The Court ultimately concluded that the best solution to the problem was to hold the case in abeyance and certify
the question whether the judgment rested on state or federal
grounds to the Illinois Supreme Court:
But because we will not proceed with a review while our jurisdiction is conjectural it does not follow that we should not take
steps to protect our jurisdiction when we are given reasonable
grounds to believe it exists. We think the simplest procedure

80. The "middle ground" role played by the remand-for-clarification approach was consciously designed to function as such. The National Tea Court explained its goal of striking
a balance as follows:
[N]o other course assures that important federal issues, such as have been argued here,
will reach this Court for adjudication; that state courts will not be the final arbiters of
important issues under the federal constitution; and that we will not encroach on the
constitutional jurisdiction of the states. This is not a mere technical rule nor a rule for
our convenience. It touches the division of authority between state courts and this
Court and is of equal importance to each. Only by such explicitness can the highest
courts of the states and this Court keep within the bounds of their respective jurisdictions.
309 U.S. at 557.
81. See Gormley, Primer,supra note 49, at 700.
82. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
83. Id. at 118-19.
84. Id. at 123-24.
85. Id. at 125-26.
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to do so, where the record is deficient, is to hold the case pending application to the state court for clarification or amend86
ment.
In this way, Herb introduced the option of staying ambiguously
grounded state high court cases and certifying a question to the
state high court in order to clarify whether its decision rested upon
state or federal grounds.
Like the Supreme Court's earliest presumption, that it lacked jurisdiction unless it had an affirmative basis for review, the Supreme
Court's two "middle ground" approaches-remanding for clarification and certifying a question-were imperfect.8 7 In fact, these approaches introduced an entirely new set of problems. When the
U.S. Supreme Court vacates the decision of the state high court88
and remands the case to that court for clarification of its grounds
for decision, a lengthy delay is inevitable and the state court's workload is doubled, as is its consumption of scarce resources in the form
of man-hours and money.8 9 Similarly, the state court's workload is
increased when it is confronted with a certified question asking it
to clarify its grounds for decision. Having to stay the case and wait
for the state high court to answer the question 90 is also likely to
waste another of the courts' most precious resources-time. 91

86. Id. at 128. Specifically, the Court directed counsel for the petitioners to apply for
certification of the question to the Illinois Supreme Court.
87. Recall that the Supreme Court's presumption that it lacked jurisdiction over state
high court cases involving an amalgam of federal and state law carried with it the potential
for erroneous federal precedent created by state high courts to stand-and that other courts,
practitioners, and citizens might rely on it. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
88. Vacatur "strips the decision below of its binding effect ... and clears the path for
future relitigation." Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2035 (2011) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
89. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 (1983) ("Vacation and continuance for
clarification have also been unsatisfactory both because of the delay and decrease in efficiency of judicial administration ....
").
90. This analysis assumes that the state high court will answer the certified question.
The possibility of the state court declining to do so raises some very serious comity issues.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of comity between the
federal and state courts in the context of U.S. Supreme Court review of state high court decisions, see infra Part III.A.2.a.
91. Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 (1952), provides an interesting case study. The United
States Supreme Court continued the case on two separate occasions without success, as the
California Supreme Court was apparently unable to provide clarification. The U.S. Supreme
Court ultimately vacated and remanded the case. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040 n.5.
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The Long Presumption

In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States Supreme Court became increasingly more aggressive in its approach to reviewing ambiguously grounded state high court cases. 92 This aggressiveness
manifested itself in the form of "the Court's willingness to examine
state law in order to determine for itself whether an independent
and adequate state ground exists to support a state judgment below." 93 In a 1975 dissenting opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall
expressed reservations about the Court's "increasingly common
practice" of reviewing certain state court decisions. 94 Justice Marshall wrote, "In my view, we have too often rushed to correct state
courts in their view of federal constitutional questions without sufficiently considering the risk that we will be drawn into rendering
95
a purely advisory opinion."
This trend toward aggressive review reached its apex in 1983's
Michigan v. Long, 96 in which the United States Supreme Court
turned its original presumption against deciding ambiguously
grounded state high court cases on its head. 97 Instead, the Court
established in Long the presumption that, in absence of a plain
statement to the contrary, a state court of last resort citing federal
law relied upon federal grounds in reaching its decision-thus open98
ing up the possibility of U.S. Supreme Court review.
The groundwork for the new presumption was unwittingly laid
in People v. Long,99 where the Michigan Supreme Court limited the
reach of the Terry v. Ohio10 0 doctrine by holding that the search of
the passenger compartment of an automobile during an otherwise
lawful investigatory stop was unconstitutional. 10 1 In its opinion,
92. Glen S. Goodnough, The Primacy Method of State Constitutional Decisionmaking:
Interpreting the Maine Constitution, 38 ME. L. REV. 491, 512 (1986); see Gormley, Primer,
supra note 49, at 701. Dean Gormley suggests that this trend was a reaction to "the onslaught of state constitutional decision making that presented itself in the 1970s and 1980s."
Id.
93. Goodnough, supra note 92, at 512 n.56. Glen Goodnough believes that "it is the perceived lack of state law independence that heightens the Supreme Court's interest in review."
Id.
94. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
U.S. Supreme Court's review of "state-court decisions upholding constitutional claims in
criminal cases").
95. Id.
96. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
97. Gormley, Primer,supra note 49, at 701 n.36 ("The U.S. Supreme Court departed from
its past presumption of laissez faire toward the states ... .
98. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1043-44 (1983).
99. 320 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
100. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting under the Fourth Amendment a warrantless limited
protective search of the person of the detainee during an investigatory stop).
101. Long, 320 N.W.2d at 870.

502

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 53

the Michigan Supreme Court made only a brief mention of the U.S.
and Michigan Constitutions in reaching its conclusion: "We hold..
. that the deputies' search of the vehicle was proscribed by the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 1, §
' 10 2
11 of the Michigan Constitution."
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the search of the passenger compartment was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Terry.10 3 The
Court's more significant holding, however, came in response to the
jurisdictional issue.10 4 Long, the criminal defendant, argued that
the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the case because decision of
the Michigan Supreme Court rested upon an adequate and independent state ground: article 1, section 11 of the Michigan Constitution.10 5 Taking notice of the fact that the Michigan Supreme
Court had mentioned the Michigan Constitution only twice in its
opinion-with one of those couched in a footnote10 6 -the Court reviewed its own recent precedent on the issue of its jurisdiction to
review ambiguously grounded state high court decisions through a
lens markedly different than the one it employed in its earlier
cases.10 7 The Court cited, for example, Beecher v. Alabama10 8 for
the proposition that it "may review a state case decided on a federal
ground even if it is clear that there was an available state ground
for decision on which the state court could properly have relied,"
and discussed Oregon v. Kennedy,1 0 9 in which the Court "rejected an
invitation to remand to the state court for clarification even when
the decision rested in part on a case from the state court, because

102. Id.; see also id. at 869 n.4. In the textual discussion of the passenger compartment
search in the opinion, the only cases the Michigan Supreme Court cited were Terry and Wong
Sun u. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The Court relegated its citations to five other U.S.
Supreme Court cases, a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and a
Michigan Supreme Court case to the footnotes.
103. Long, 463 U.S. at 1035.
104. "The jurisprudential questions presented in this case are far more important than
the question whether the Michigan police officer's search of respondent's car violated the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1037 (majority opinion).
106. Id. at 1037 & n.3.
107. Id. at 1038-39. In its more recent cases, the Court has adopted a practice of reviewing state law on its own in order to determine whether state or federal law provided the basis
for state high courts' decisions, id. at 1039, thus affording little deference to those courts. In
contrast, the Court's earlier practices-dismissing the case outright, remanding, or certifying
a question, id.-all involved a higher degree of deference to the state high courts.
108. 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (per curiam).
109. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
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[it] determined that the state case itself rested upon federal
grounds."11o
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor discussed the shortcomings of-and ultimately rejected-the U.S. Supreme Court's previous approaches to its own jurisdiction to review state high court
cases where it is unclear whether the court's decision rests upon
state or federal grounds.1 For the Court to conduct its own examination of state law was unsatisfactory because of the Court's limited expertise in the area, as well as the equally limited discussion
of state issues that the litigants often present.1 1 2 Vacating and remanding or continuing cases in order to obtain clarification were
likely to cause delays and burden the state courts, and dismissing
cases for lack of jurisdiction had the potential to compromise the
uniformity of federal law by allowing erroneous interpretations to
persist.113
In order to avoid these pitfalls and "achieve the consistency that
is necessary" in the Court's approach to the review of ambiguously
grounded state high court cases, the Long Court set forth a method
intended to respect the autonomy of state courts of last resort and
11 4
prevent the issuance of advisory opinions:
Accordingly, when, as in this case, a state court decision fairly
appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven
with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence
of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of
the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation
that the state court decided the case the way it did because it
5
believed that federal law required it to do S0.11

110. Long, 463 U.S. at 1039. The Long Court also quoted a line from Kennedy in which
the Court explained that "[e]ven if the case admitted of more doubt as to whether federal and
state grounds for decision were intermixed, the fact that the state court relied to the extent
it did on federal grounds requires us to reach the merits." Id. at 1039 (citing Kennedy, 456
U.S. at 671).
111. Id. at 1039-40. Justice O'Connor explained:
This ad hoc method of dealing with cases that involve possible adequate and independent state grounds is antithetical to the doctrinal consistency that is required when
sensitive issues of federal-state relations are involved. Moreover, none of the various
methods of disposition that we have employed thus far recommends itself as the preferred method that we should apply to the exclusion of others, and we therefore determine that it is appropriate to reexamine our treatment of this jurisdictional issue in
order to achieve the consistency that is necessary.
Id. at 1039.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1039-40.
114. Id. at 1040.
115. Id. at 1040-41 (emphasis added).
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The Court thus created the presumption that ambiguously
grounded state high court decisions rest upon federal law:
[I]n determining, as we must, whether we have jurisdiction to
review a case that is alleged to rest on adequate and independent state grounds .... we merely assume that there are no such
grounds when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the
state court relied upon an adequate and independent state
ground and when it fairly appears that the state court rested
1 16
its decision primarily on federal law.
Recognizing that these ambiguously grounded opinions often include citations to both state and federal precedent, Justice O'Connor also included guidance as to the role state high courts would be
expected to play in order to avoid confusion as to the basis for their
opinions:
If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as
it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need
only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion
that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of
guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the
11 7
court has reached.
Later in the opinion, Justice O'Connor added another component
to this "plain statement" rule by describing it as a 'plain statement'
that a decision rests upon adequate and independent state
1 18
grounds."
In its pursuit of "doctrinal consistency" with respect to the United
States Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review the ambiguously
grounded decisions of state high courts,1 1 9 the Long Court thus set
in motion a sea change marked by two novel rules. First, the presumption: where it is unclear whether the state high court decision
rests on federal- or state-law grounds, the U.S. Supreme Court will
presume that the case relies on federal precedent in absence of a
plain statement to the contrary. Second, the "plain statement" rule:
in order to avoid U.S. Supreme Court review, state courts of last
resort wishing to base their decisions upon independent state
grounds must expressly state that those grounds are adequate and
independent; if the state court cites federal precedent as persuasive
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1042 (internal citations omitted).
1041 (emphasis added).
1042.
1039.
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authority, it should clearly state as much. Given that the net effect
of the presumption of jurisdiction and the plain statement rule is to
essentially place a finger on the scale in favor of U.S. Supreme
Court review, it is perhaps not surprising that a byproduct of Long
has been "expansionist post-Michigan v. Long jurisprudence" 120 on
the part of the Court.

III.
A.

THE FAILURE OF LONG

The Problem: The Failingsof the Long Presumption

It is somewhat ironic that the Long Court "openly admit[ted] that
we have thus far not developed a satisfying and consistent approach
for resolving this vexing issue,"1 21 as the Long presumption has
proven to be anything but "satisfying and consistent." Given the
volume and hostility level of the criticism on the subject from courts
and commentators alike, it is clear that this "vexing issue" remains
unresolved.
1.

The United States Supreme Court Itself Has Questioned
the Wisdom of Long
a.

The Dissents

In the years following the inception of the Long presumption, an
onslaught of scholarly commentary questioned, dissected, and criticized the case's jurisprudential impact and the negative side effects
22
it portended for U.S. Supreme Court-state high court relations.

120. Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 223 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. Long, 463 U.S. at 1038.
122. See Goodnough, supra note 92, at 513 n.58 (listing the following scholarly critiques
of Long: Ronald K. L. Collins, Plain Statements: The Supreme Court's New Requirements, 70
A.B.A. 92 (1984); Independent and Adequate State Grounds: The Long and the Short of It, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 211 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1984); Timothy

P. O'Neill, The Good, the Bad, and the Burger Court: Victims' Rights and a New Model of
CriminalReview, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363 (1984); David A. Schlueter, Federalism

and Supreme Court Review of Expansive State Court Decisions:A Response to Unfortunate
Impressions, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q., 523 (1984); David A. Schlueter, JudicialFederalism

and Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions:A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1079 (1984); Note, Developing a State Jurisprudenceunder Michigan v. Long,
103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983), 12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 99 (1984); Comment, EmergingJurisdictionalDoctrines of the Burger Court: A Doctrineof Convenience, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 316 (1985); Note,
Michigan v. Long: A New Jurisdictionand a New Frisk, 30 LoY. L. REV. 198 (1984); Comment, Michigan v. Long: Presumptive FederalAppellate Jurisdictionover State Cases ContainingAmbiguous Grounds of Decision, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1081 (1984); Comment, Michigan
v. Long: The Supreme Court EstablishesPresumptive Jurisdictionover State Court Cases, 20
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In reality, however, the criticism of the presumption began immediately-with Justice Stevens' dissent in Long. Justice Stevens
pointed out that, rather than presuming federal law controlled the
outcome of an ambiguously grounded state high court case in the
absence of an express statement to the contrary, the Court's own
precedent supported the opposite presumption. 123 If the majority
was to reject the two "middle ground" approaches, stare decisis thus
compelled a return to the Court's longstanding tradition of declin1 24
ing to re-decide state high court cases.
In Justice Stevens' view, the circumstances of Long should not
have led the Court to second-guess its traditional approach. 25 The
Michigan Supreme Court had upheld an exercise of rights by a
Michigan citizen; it had not permitted Michigan authorities to deprive him of his rights.1 26 Because the Michigan court had simply
added protections beyond the federal minimum, "the final outcome
1 27
of the state processes offended no federal interest whatever."
Justice Stevens "believe[d] that in reviewing the decisions of state
courts, the primary role of this Court is to make sure that persons
1 28
who seek to vindicate federal rights have been fairly heard."
Justice Stevens offered several other reasons why the Court
should resist the temptation to review the opinions of state high
courts. He questioned the wisdom of the majority's stated purpose
in instituting the presumption in favor of redeciding state high
court cases on federal grounds, warning that "the 'need for uniformity in federal law' is truly an ungovernable engine. '129 Despite
the risk of erroneous state high court interpretations of federal law,
the United States Supreme Court had "never claimed jurisdiction
to correct such errors, no matter how egregious they may be, and no

NEW ENG. L. REV. 123 (1985); Note, State Law Independence and the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine after Michigan v. Long, 62 WASH. U. L. REV. 547 (1984); The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 224 (1983)).
123. Long, 463 U.S. at 1066-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S.
277, 284 (1956); Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541, 546 (1952); Lynch v. New York ex rel.
Pierson, 293 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1934)); see also Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. N. Realty Co., 244
U.S. 300, 302, 304 (1917); Consol. Tpk. Co. v. Norfolk & Ocean View Ry. Co., 228 U.S. 596,
599 (1913); Allen v. Arguimbau, 198 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1905); Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach.
Co. v. Skinner, 139 U.S. 293, 295, 297 (1891); Johnson v. Risk, 137 U.S. 300, 306-07 (1890).
124. Long, 463 U.S. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1067-68.
127. Id. at 1068.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1070 (quoting majority opinion).
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matter how much they may thwart the desires of the state electorate." 130 To do so would be to run afoul of the prohibition on rendering advisory opinions and risk disrespecting the authority of the
highest courts of the sovereign states.13 1 "I am thoroughly baffled,"
Justice Stevens wrote, "by the Court's suggestion that it must
stretch its jurisdiction and reverse the judgment of the Michigan
Supreme Court in order to show '[r]espect for the independence of
' 132
state courts.'
Throughout the decades after the United States Supreme Court
issued its decision in Long, Justice Stevens continued to raise incisive attacks on the Long presumption in subsequent concurring
opinions and dissents. One of the most notable was his dissent in
the 1986 case of Delaware v. Van Arsdall. 33 In Van Arsdall, the
majority agreed with the Delaware Supreme Court that the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights had
been violated at trial, but held that the state high court should have
applied a harmless-error analysis instead of concluding that the
Confrontation Clause violation automatically necessitated a new
trial.1 34 The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Delaware Supreme
1 35
Court's judgment accordingly and remanded the case.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens echoed the sentiments he first expounded in his dissenting opinion in Long. He reminded the majority of the Court's historical reluctance to reevaluate state high court
decisions resting upon a mix of federal and state grounds and criticized it for taking what he perceived to be an unusually aggressive
approach toward deciding constitutional questions where the need
to do so was either questionable or absent. 136 Justice Stevens cautioned the Court that the Long presumption in favor of deciding
ambiguously grounded state high court cases placed it at risk of exceeding the boundaries of its jurisdiction and disturbing the "mutual trust" between the United States Supreme Court and the sov-

130. Id. at 1071.
131. Id. at 1071-72.
132. Id. at 1072 (quoting majority opinion).
133. 475 U.S. 673, 689-708 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 674 (majority opinion).
135. Id. at 684.
136. See id. at 690-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained that the United
States Supreme Court's status conferred upon it "a special obligation to make sure that our
conclusions concerning our own jurisdiction rest on a firm and legitimate foundation." Id. at
692. He thus urged the Court exercise caution: "When the state-court decision to be reviewed
is ambiguous, and it is not even clear that the judgment rests on a federal ground, the basis
for exercising jurisdiction is even less tenable." Id. at 698.
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ereign state high courts that is critical to the operation of the federal system. 137 He warned that, rather than settling the issue of
the proper treatment of ambiguously grounded cases, "the Court's
[current] approach does nothing to minimize, and indeed multiplies, future occasions on which state courts may be called upon to
'138
clarify whether their judgments were in fact based on state law.
In this respect, Justice Stevens' prediction seems to have been accurate: he had occasion to reiterate the same criticisms of the Long
presumption that he raised in his Long and Van Arsdall dissents1 39
and add new ones-on many other occasions.
Justice Stevens was not the only member of the Court to express
reservations about the Long presumption. Dissenting in Arizona v.
Evans,1 40 Justice Ginsburg recognized that "[h]istorically, state
laws were the source, and state courts the arbiters, of individual
rights. 1 41 She expressed concern that the Long presumption "impedes the States' ability to serve as laboratories for testing solutions

137. See id. at 694-701.
138. Id. at 701.
139. See, e.g., Florida v. Rigterink, 559 U.S. 965 (2010) (granting certiorari, vacating judgment, and remanding for reconsideration in light of Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50 (2010))
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Because the independence of the state-law ground is clear from the
face of the opinion, we do not have power to vacate the judgment of the Florida Supreme
Court." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S.
212, 223 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihis is a case in which the Court has granted
review in order to make sure that a State's highest court has not granted its citizens any
greater protection than the bare minimum required by the Federal Constitution."); Kansas
v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 203 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I continue to hope that a future
Court will recognize the error of this allocation of resources and return to our older and better
practice of restraint." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Brigham City, Utah
v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 409 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I continue to believe 'that a
policy of judicial restraint-one that allows other decisional bodies to have the last word in
legal interpretation until it is truly necessary for this Court to intervene-enables this Court
to make its most effective contribution to our federal system of government." (citing Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1067 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting))); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S.
992, 1031 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Why, I ask with all due respect, did not the Justices who voted to grant certiorari in this case allow the wisdom of state judges to prevail in
California, especially when they have taken a position consistent with those of state judges
in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming?").
140. 514 U.S. 1 (1995). Justice Stevens joined Justice Ginsburg's dissent, which he called
an important opinion." Id. at 18.
141. Id. at 30 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States'Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 382 (1980)).
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to novel legal problems" 142 and recommended that it be overruled. 143
In its place, Justice Ginsburg advocated for the opposite presumption: absent a plain statement to the contrary, the Court should presume that it lacks jurisdiction and dismiss the writ of certiorari. 144
In this way, she reasoned, state courts of last resort would be free
to experiment without fear of federal review.1 45 Even before Long,
Justice Marshall also disagreed that the correct way to resolve the
problem of ambiguously grounded state high court cases was to assume the Court had jurisdiction. "In my view," he wrote, "we have
too often rushed to correct state courts in their view of federal constitutional questions without sufficiently considering the risk that
we will be drawn into rendering a purely advisory opinion.1 46
It should not come as a surprise that the Long presumption faced
opposition from members of the Court itself. The United States Supreme Court was aware of the jurisdictional conundrum that Long
poses well over a century before that decision was issued: namely,
presuming federal grounds where they may not lie increases the
risk of issuing advisory opinions.1 47 When state high court cases
rest upon adequate and independent state grounds, U.S. Supreme
Court review cannot change the outcome and thus can play no more
than an academic role-a set of circumstances proscribed by Article
111.148 "This point," Justice Kennedy recently wrote, "has been re149
peated with force and clarity."'
Adherence to it becomes complicated, however, in cases where it
is unclear whether the state high court's grounds for decision are
rooted in state or federal law. This is because, as Justice Jackson

142. For the "laboratories" analogy, Justice Ginsburg cited Justice Brandeis' famous dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932): "It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment." Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
143. Evans, 514 U.S. at 24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 24, 26.
145. See id. at 30-31.
146. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2037-38 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
148. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991).
149. Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2037-38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983) and Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945)); see also
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729 ("Because this Court has no power to review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment, resolution of any independent federal
ground for the decision could not affect the judgment and would therefore be advisory.");
Herb, 324 U.S. at 128 ("This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the principle that it will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independent
state grounds.").
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explained in Herb u.Pitcairn,the Court "cannot . . .refrain from
interfering in state law questions and also to review federal ones
without making a determination whether the one or the other controls the judgment. ''150 Despite its goal of resolving the "vexing issue" of ambiguous grounds, 151 one of Long's problems is that the
Court has yet to define the extent to which a state high court can
rely on federal precedent before the decision becomes one of federal
1 52
law, thus bringing it within the U.S. Supreme Court's purview.
It is, therefore, quite understandable that some members of the
Court have balked at the degree of risk of transgressing its jurisdictional limits that the Long presumption entails.
b.

The Bush v. Gore Controversy:A Vote of No
Confidence in Long

Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that the Court itself lacks
confidence in Long is the fact that the Court departed from the presumption in a particularly high-stakes situation: the controversy
surrounding the 2000 presidential election. The outcome of the
election hinged upon which candidate, Texas Governor George W.
Bush or Vice President Al Gore, would win Florida's electoral
votes.1 53 These twenty-five contested votes would give Bush a total
of 271-one more than the 270 he needed to win the Electoral College and the election.1 54 Bush's initial margin of victory in Florida
was so narrow as to trigger an automatic recount under the state's
election laws, after which he remained the apparent winner, albeit
by a smaller margin of victory. 155 Gore contested this result, seek56
ing a manual recount of the ballots cast in four Florida counties.
The Florida Supreme Court held that such a recount was permissible under state election law, set a deadline for counties to amend
their ballot counts, and directed the Florida Secretary of State to
accept manual counts submitted before that deadline.1 57 When
Bush petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, the Court
150.
151.

Herb, 324 U.S. at 127.
Long, 463 U.S. at 1038.

152.
153.

Goodnough, supra note 92, at 516.
Barry C. Burden, Minor Parties in the 2000 PresidentialElection, in MODELS OF

VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: THE 2000 U.S. ELECTION 206, 219 (Herbert F. Weisberg

& Clyde Wilcox eds., 2003).
154. See KENNETH DAUTRICH & DAVID A. YALOF, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: HISTORICAL,
POPULAR AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 462 (2d ed. 2011).

155. Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd. (Bush 1), 531 U.S. 70, 73-74 (2000) (per
curiam).
156. Id. at 74.
157. Id. at 75-76; see also Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220
(Fla. 2000), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
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granted the petition in part and agreed to consider: (1) whether the
Florida Supreme Court had violated either the Due Process Clause
or 3 U.S.C. § 5158 by altering Florida's procedure for appointing its
electors after the election, and (2) whether that court's actions had
infringed upon Congress' Article II power to promulgate procedures
159
for the selection of electors.
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis by noting
that the process of selecting presidential electors is governed by an
interplay between state law and Article II of the United States Constitution.1 60 However, the Court realized that the Florida Supreme
Court's opinion did not make clear to what extent the Florida Constitution, consistent with Article II, "circumscribe[d] the legislature's power," and the opinion did not specifically discuss 3 U.S.C.
§ 5 at all.16 1 The Court thus determined that, in view of the questions presented, the Florida Supreme Court's opinion left "consid16 2
erable uncertainty as to the precise grounds for the decision."
Under these circumstances, in which the United States Supreme
Court found itself reviewing an ambiguously grounded state high
court decision, the Michigan v. Long presumption should have applied. As Justice Ginsburg succinctly explained in her Evans dissent, "If it is unclear whether a state court's decision rests on state
or federal law, Long dictates the assumption that the state court
relied on federal law."163 The Bush I Court confronted precisely that
situation. Under Long, therefore, the United States Supreme Court

158. 3 U.S.C. § 5, entitled "Determination of controversy as to the appointment of electors," provides:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by judicial or other
methods or procedures, and such determination shall have been made at least six days
before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said day, and made at least six days prior to said time of
meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the
electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as
the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State is concerned.
Id.
159. Bush I, 531 U.S. at 73. The Article II provision at issue in Bush I provides:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or
Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed
an Elector.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
160. See Bush l, 531 U.S. at 76.
161. Id. at 77-78 (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)).
162. Id. at 78 (quoting Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555 (1940)).
163. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 24 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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should have presumed federal law controlled and proceeded to evaluate the merits of the case.
Despite Long's applicability, however, the Bush I Court did not
presume that it had jurisdiction. Instead, it cited National Tea for
the proposition that its "considerable" uncertainty as to the Florida
Supreme Court's precise grounds for decision was "sufficient reason
...to decline at this time to review the federal questions asserted
to be present. ' 16 4 The Court did not merely borrow language from
National Tea for merely stylistic purposes; rather, the case supplied
the crux of the rationale supporting the Court's conclusion:
It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered
by us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally
important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state
courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court
of the validity under the federal constitution of state action.
Intelligent exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask
for the elimination of the obscurities and ambiguities from the
16 5
opinions in such cases.
In accordance with National Tea, which had apparently been
overruled by Long seventeen years earlier,1 66 the Bush I Court vacated the decision of the Florida Supreme Court and remanded the
case for clarification. 167
164. Bush I, 531 U.S. at 78 (citing Nat'l Tea, 309 U.S. at 555).
165. Id. (quoting Nat'l Tea, 309 U.S. at 557).
166. In his Long dissent, Justice Stevens recognized the overruling of National Tea. See
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1071 n.4 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Bush , 531 U.S. at 78; see also Nat'l Tea, 309 U.S. at 556 (adopting as the proper
approach to ambiguously grounded state high court cases the practice of "vacat[ing] the judgment and .. .remand[ing] the cause for further proceedings, so that the federal question
might be dissected out or the state and federal questions clearly separated.").
Interestingly, the Florida Supreme Court did not attempt to insulate itself from further U.S.
Supreme Court review by invoking the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine on
remand. See Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000). Professor Althouse has explored the thought process motivating the United States Supreme
Court's decision to incur this risk by remanding Bush I:
Why did the United States Supreme Court, by vacating and remanding the case, offer
the Florida Supreme Court the opportunity to insulate itself from further review? It
seemed all too easy for the Florida Supreme Court to embed the values it had previously derived from the state's constitution in a discussion of the intent of the legislature. If the United States Supreme Court at that point thought the Florida Supreme
Court had strategically tried to insulate itself with a false assertion about state law, it
would be quite hard to find a way to state a ground for reversal. A straightforward
"We don't believe you" would fall short of the conventions of craftsmanship and comity.
Ann Althouse, The Authoritative LawsayingPower ofthe State Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court: Conflicts of Judicial Orthodoxy in the Bush-Gore Litigation, 61 MD.
L. REV. 508, 521-22 (2002) [hereinafter Althouse, Authoritative Lawsaying Power]; see also
Ann Althouse, Bush v. Gore's Place in the Rehnquist Court'sFederalismOeuvre in THE FINAL
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This course of action in a high-profile case of critical importance
stands as powerful evidence of the United States Supreme Court's
discomfort with the Long presumption when the stakes are high.
With the nation hanging upon its every word, the Court departed
from Long and instead chose to rely upon a then-sixty-year-old case
that it resurrected for the occasion-a subtle, symbolic vote of no
168
confidence in the Long presumption.
2.

State High Courts Have Evidenced Distastefor Long,
thus Frustratingthe "Adequateand Independent State
Grounds"Doctrine

A review of the post-Long state high court case law on the issue
of U.S. Supreme Court review of state high court decisions reveals
that the state high courts' attitude toward the Long presumption is
less subtle than that of their federal counterpart. The state high
courts have shown a general distaste for Long's tendency to invite
U.S. Supreme Court intervention, especially with respect to state
constitutional decisions where the state high court adds (or attempts to add) additional protections above the federal minimum.
The state high courts have reacted to U.S. Supreme Court review of
these decisions in a variety of negative ways, ranging from begrudging acceptance to sarcasm to outright hostility. More problematic
is the fact that over the course of the thirty-plus years since the
inception of the Long presumption, the state high courts whose decisions are vacated and remanded almost invariably reinstate their
original decisions on remand. This practice squanders the courts'
precious resources and renders the U.S. Supreme Court's opinions
ARBITER: THE CONSEQUENCES OF BUSH V. GORE FOR LAW AND POLITICS 133, 138 (Christopher

P. Banks, David B. Cohen, & John C. Green, eds., 2005) [hereinafter Althouse, Bush v. Gore's
Place] (discussing the pragmatic considerations likely to have motivated the Court's decision).
On the case's third trip to the United States Supreme Court, Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore
and the Boundary between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1410 (2001), the legal issues
surrounding the Florida recount were finally-if, in the view of many, unsatisfyingly-resolved in Bush v. Gore (Bush I1), 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). In a 5-4 per curiam decision, the Supreme Court halted the recount, holding that no remedy that Florida could devise
would satisfy the time limit under 3 U.S.C. § 5 in accordance with "minimal constitutional
standards." Bush II, 531 U.S. at 110. The Court's decision paved the way for the Florida
Secretary of State's certification of George W. Bush as the winner of the state's electoral votes
to stand.
168. Given the symbolic significance of the Court's departure from Long, it is surprising
that this aspect of the 2000 election cases has received so little attention. In fact, the author's
research revealed only two scholars who have explored this specific issue: Professors Althouse and Solimine. See, e.g., Althouse, Bush v. Gore's Place, supra note 167, at 138; Althouse, Authoritative Lawsaying Power, supra note 167, at 521-22; Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 347
(2002).
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advisory. Because the Long presumption prevents the benefits of
the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine-judicial
economy, comity, and jurisdiction1 6 9-from being realized, the state
courts' dissatisfaction with Long is hardly surprising.
a.

Comity

What is perhaps surprising in hindsight is that fostering comity
was one of the stated objectives of the Long Court, which had hoped
to curtail the practice of issuing advisory opinions questioning the
decisions of state high courts: "By refraining from deciding cases
that rest on an adequate and independent state ground, federal
courts show proper respect for state courts ....,,17o In practice, however, the Long presumption in favor of U.S. Supreme Court review
risks harming the state and federal courts' mutual respect for one
another. As one scholar points out, "The result of the Supreme
Court's heightened scrutiny of the bases of state court decisions is
increased tension between state supreme courts and the United
States Supreme Court."1 71 Justice Stevens warned of this very
problem in his Van Arsdall dissent, cautioning the majority that
"the Court's willingness to presume jurisdiction to review state
remedies evidences a lack of respect for state courts and will, I fear,
be a recurrent source of friction between the federal and state judi1 72
ciaries."
i.

Permits the U.S. Supreme Court To Critique
State High Courts' Opinions

The Long presumption effectively grants the United States Supreme Court license to criticize and second-guess the decisions and
opinion-writing choices of the state high courts. Chief Justice
Rehnquist criticized the majority for falling prey to this temptation
in his dissent in Bunkley v. Florida,73 which did not deal specifically with a state constitutional issue but illustrates the phenomenon nonetheless. Chief Justice Rehnquist took the majority to task
for "critici[zing] ...the state court for failing to anticipate [the U.S.

Supreme Court's] holding," "criticiz[ing] the Florida Supreme Court
for its workmanship in the decision under review," and "repri-

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Gormley, Primer, supra note 49, at 699-700.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983) (emphasis added).
Goodnough, supra note 92, at 514.
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 691 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
538 U.S. 835 (2003).
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mand[ing] the Florida court for failing to reach its holding in a sufficiently clear manner. '"174 Ironically, the Chief Justice levied his
attacks in defense of the very presumption that gave the majority
the opportunity to criticize and reprimand the Florida Supreme
Court in the first place: "This rebuke to the state court violates the
well-established rule that this Court will not 'require state courts
' 175
to reconsider cases to clarify the grounds of their decisions.'
Youngblood v. West Virginia 76 provides a helpful example of the
comity issues raised when the Court elects to err on the side of taking jurisdiction over a state high court decision. In granting certiorari, vacating the West Virginia Supreme Court's decision, and remanding the case, the Court offered the following reason: "If this
Court is to reach the merits of this case, it would be better to have
the benefit of the views of the full Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia on the .. issue.1 77 In his dissent, Justice Scalia seized
the opportunity to draw the Court's attention to the dangers of aggressive grants of certiorari in such instances. The majority, Justice Scalia argued, "purports to conscript the judges of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia to write what is essentially an
amicus brief on the merits of an issue they have already decided, in
order to facilitate our possible review of the merits at some later
time."1 78 Calling the majority's "tutelary remand, as to a schoolboy
made to do his homework again," unjustified, Justice Scalia reminded the majority that the state high courts are sovereign entities and "not, as we treat them today, the creatures and agents of
this body. 1 79 For the United States Supreme Court to assert authority in this manner-by critiquing and reprimanding a state
high court-is antithetical to the mutual respect among sovereign
bodies that is the essence of comity.
ii.

PressuresState High Courts To Change Their
Minds on Remand

Another unwelcome side effect of Long that could further compromise the mutual respect between the state high courts and the U.S.
174. Id. at 844 & n.2 (Rehnquist, C., dissenting).
175. Id. at 844 n.2 (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 1040).
176. 547 U.S. 867 (2006) (per curiam). Even though Youngblood was a non-Long case in
which the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction was not at issue, it is nonetheless illustrative of
the ways in which comity can be harmed when the Court's grants of certiorari in state high
court cases rest on shaky foundations.
177. Id. at 870.
178. Id. at 872 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (first emphasis added).
179. Id. at 873-74 (internal quotation marks and citations to a previous Scalia dissent
omitted).
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Supreme Court-and disturb the delicate balance of federalism-is
the potential for the state high courts to feel pressured into secondguessing their own conclusions with respect to issues of state law
in response to the Court's purportedly neutral grants of certiorari.
This aspect of the Long presumption's negative impact on comity is
particularly insidious, as it appears that by merely granting certiorari and assuming jurisdiction to review a state high court decision,
the United States Supreme Court can silently influence its state
counterparts to change their minds on remand. Justice Stevens
was among the first to anticipate this possibility, writing in his
Long dissent, "Less obvious is the impact on mutual trust when the
state court on remand-perhaps out of misplaced sense of dutyconfines its state constitution to the boundaries marked by this
'18 0
Court for the Federal Constitution."
Justice Scalia also attacked the grant of certiorari in Youngblood,
where the majority granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded because "it would be better to have the benefit of the views of the full
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia on the .. issue,"1 81 on
the grounds that the Court's stated reasons for granting certiorari
were pretextual. Justice Scalia offered what he suspected to be the
majority's actual motive: to "induce [the West Virginia Supreme
Court] to change its mind on remand, sparing us the trouble of correcting the suspected error."182 Rather colorfully likening the
Court's means to this end to the actions of a "mob enforcer [who]
might suggest that it would be 'better' to make protection payments,"1 1 3 Justice Scalia concluded that, "[a]t worst, [the Court's decision] is an implied threat to the lower court, not backed by a judg18s 4
ment of our own, that it had 'better' reconsider its holding.
Justice Scalia's observation that "[t]hose whose judgments we review have sometimes viewed even our legitimate, intervening-event
[granting-vacating-remanding] orders as polite directives that they
reverse themselves" 185 seems to have merit. This is especially problematic in cases where state high courts feel pressured to change
their minds about adding additional rights above the federal minimum established by the United States Supreme Court when cases
are returned to them on remand pursuant to Long. In State v.
Badger,1 86 for example, the Vermont Supreme Court warned
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 699 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Youngblood, 547 U.S. at 870 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
Id. at 873 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 873.
450 A.2d 336 (Vt. 1982).
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against conducting an independent analysis on remand from the
United States Supreme Court in the name of avoiding the "potential
for great friction between the state and federal judiciaries, and concomitant damage to the authority, efficiency, and finality of the
United States Supreme Court. ' 18 7 In State v. Jackson,18 8 a Montana
Supreme Court Justice advocated for precisely the opposite course
of action. Believing that the U.S. Supreme Court's vacatur and remand of one of his court's constitutional decisions under Long "command[ed] us in effect to withdraw the constitutional rights which
we felt we should extend to our state citizens back to the limits proscribed by the federal decisions," Justice Sheehy urged his colleagues to "show our judicial displeasure by insisting that in Montana, this sovereign state can interpret its constitution to guarantee
rights to its citizens greater than those guaranteed by the federal
constitution. 1 8 9 Whether the state chooses to acquiesce to the perceived dictates of the U.S. Supreme Court (as in Vermont) or resist
them (as in Montana) is ultimately irrelevant to analysis of Long's
effect on comity; the mere fact that the state high court judges felt
pressured by the U.S. Supreme Court in both cases to act or refrain
from acting is evidence enough.
iii. The Plain Statement Rule Fails To Address
Long's Comity Implications
Long's plain statement rule, which was intended help the Court
avoid such improvident grants of certiorari, has done nothing to
ameliorate the comity problems that Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia identified. It could even be argued that for the
United States Supreme Court to dictate to the state high courts that
they must follow such a formal requirement in order to avoid review
can be considered demeaning toward the high courts of sovereign
states. Worse still, the plain statement rule at times seems to present state high courts who feel their autonomy has been compromised with an opportunity to engage in a form of "self-help" in an
effort to vindicate and protect their decisions.
Some state high courts have utilized the plain statement as an
opportunity to reassert their sovereignty. On remand from the U.S.
Supreme Court in State v. Knapp,1 90 for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court obeyed the plain statement rule, making clear that its
187. Id. at 347; see also West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1020 (Utah 1994)
(citing Badger as an example of the comity problems that result from the Long presumption).
188. 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983).
189. Id. at 260 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
190. 700 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. 2005).
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"decision rests on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
state grounds" and citing Long.19 1 But the Court did not stop there.
"Further," the opinion continued, "we reinstate all portions of our
decision in State v. Knapp [the decision the U.S. Supreme Court
vacated] .. .not implicated by the Supreme Court's order vacating
our decision in light of United States v. Patane.1' 92 The New Hampshire Supreme Court went even further in State v. Ball,1 93 where it
attempted to declare the plain statement requirement satisfied in
1 94
all future cases.
Other state high courts have attempted to use the plain statement as a means by which to insulate their decisions from U.S. Supreme Court review. In Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski,1 95 the
New York Court of Appeals announced its decision by declaring,
"For the reasons stated below, we adhere to our determination [in
the previous decision] .... premising our decision on independent
State constitutional grounds as well as the Federal review directed
by the Supreme Court. 1 96 In this manner, the Court of Appeals
used the plain statement to make perfectly clear, should a petition
for certiorari be filed with the U.S. Supreme Court, that it had (1)
provided the requisite plain statement, and (2) incorporated the
Court's analysis into its decision, thus rendering any further review
by the Court unnecessary and redundant. On a more subtle level,
the New York Court of Appeals also implied that such review by the
197
Court would be unwelcome.
Even more troubling from a comity standpoint are cases in which
a state high court does obey the plain statement rule by expressly
proclaiming that its opinion is based upon adequate and independent state grounds, only to see the U.S. Supreme Court question and
ultimately reject the plain statement. In Howard v. Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C.,19 8 the Oklahoma Supreme Court included a statement that its "determinations rest squarely within Oklahoma law[,]
191. Id. at 901 n.3 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983)).
192. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
193. 471 A.2d 347 (N.H. 1983).
194. Id. ("We hereby make clear that when this court cites federal or other State court
opinions in construing provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution or statutes, we rely on
those precedents merely for guidance and do not consider our results bound by those decisions."). In Arizona v. Evans, Justice Ginsburg expressed doubt that New Hampshire's "blanket disclaimer" would be effective. See 514 U.S. 1, 31 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
195. 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1991).
196. Id. at 1272.
197. In his concurring opinion, Judge Simons accused the majority of basing its holding
on the U.S. Constitution, but nonetheless conducting a state constitutional analysis in order
to ward off U.S. Supreme Court review. Id. at 1283 (Simons, J., concurring).
198. 273 P.3d 20, 23 (Okla. 2011), cert. granted,judgment vacated sub nom. Nitro-Lift
Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S.Ct. 500 (2012) (per curiam). Nitro-Lift Technologies did not
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which provides bona fide, separate, adequate, and independent
grounds for our decision." 199 Notwithstanding this plain statement,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the
decision, and remanded the case. 20 0 Explaining that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's incorrect application of the Federal Arbitration
Act necessitated vacatur, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that
the Oklahoma court's plain statement of state grounds was, in fact,
"not so," as its state analysis was not truly independent of its conclusions with respect to federal law. 20 1 The Court directed a rebuke
toward the Oklahoma court as it explained its basis for taking jurisdiction:
The Oklahoma Supreme Court acknowledged the [United
States Supreme Court] cases on which Nitro-Lift relied, as well
as their relevant holdings, but chose to discount these controlling decisions. Its conclusion that, despite this Court's jurisprudence, the underlying contract's validity is purely a matter
of state law for state-court determination is all the more reason
20 2
for this Court to assert jurisdiction.
If the U.S. Supreme Court begins to make a habit of routinely
questioning and rejecting the state high courts' plain statements of
adequate and independent state grounds, those courts will have
even less of an incentive to comply with the plain statement rule in
the future.
iv.

The State High Courts'HostileReactions to
Long

It would have been interesting to see the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of its plain
statement as pretextual if Nitro-Lift had come before it once again
on remand. 20 3 In some state high court cases that were reviewed
and remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to Long, state
implicate the Oklahoma Constitution, but nonetheless makes a valuable contribution as a
recent example of this extreme circumstance.
199. Id. at 23 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)).
200. Nitro-Lift Techs., 133 S. Ct. at 504.
201. Id. at 502.
202. Id. at 503. In her analysis of Bush v. Gore and its predecessors, Professor Althouse
conjectured that, if the Florida Supreme Court had included a plain statement after the U.S.
Supreme Court remanded Bush I, "it would be quite hard to find a way to state a ground for
reversal" the next time the Court encountered the case. Althouse, Bush v. Gore's Place, supra
note 167, at 522. Nitro-Lift Technologies, however, suggests otherwise; the Court expressed
no reservations about rejecting the Oklahoma Supreme Court's plain statement.
203. As of June 17, 2015, the author could locate no such decision.
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high courts that did not welcome having to re-decide their own cases
have expressed sentiments ranging from defeat to frustration to
outright hostility toward the U.S. Supreme Court. In these cases,
Justice Stevens' fear that "the Court's willingness to presume jurisdiction to review state remedies evidences a lack of respect for state
courts . . . will . . . be a recurrent source of friction between the
federal and state judiciaries '20 4 has indeed proven legitimate.
The "friction" Justice Stevens warned of jumps from the pages of
these opinions. In some, the state high court's tone is sarcastic, as
was the New York Court of Appeals' in Immuno AG.: "One year ago,
applying what appearedto be settled law, we affirmed the dismissal
of plaintiffs libel action ....
[T]he United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded the case.
.. 20 In other cases, state high court judges have reacted angrily
toward the U.S. Supreme Court's vacatur or reversal of their decisions. Perhaps the most memorable and noteworthy of these was
Montana Supreme Court Justice Sheehy's blistering dissent in
State v. Jackson,206 a 1983 case that followed closely on the heels of
Long. Joined by the colleague who authored the original opinion
that was vacated as a result of the United States Supreme Court's
presumption that the decision did not rest on Montana Constitutional grounds, Justice Sheehy criticized the United States Supreme Court for curbing Montana's attempt to afford its citizens
additional constitutional protections-and the majority of the Montana Supreme Court for "knuckling under to this unjustified expansion of federal judicial power into the perimeters of our state
power. '20 7 Justice Sheehy did not mince words as he described
"what [the Long] majority has done to Montana. '20 8 He expressed
grave concerns about the federalism implications of Long:
Now the United States Supreme Court has interjected itself,
commanding us in effect to withdraw the constitutional rights
which we felt we should extend to our state citizens back to the
limits proscribed by the federal decisions. Effectively, the
United States Supreme Court has intruded upon the rights of
20 9
the judiciaryof this sovereign state.
204. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 691 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1271-72 (N.Y. 1991) (emphasis
added) (adhering to prior judgment).
206. 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983). Justice Stevens acknowledged Justice Sheehy's "rather
bitter[" tone in his Van Arsdall dissent. 475 U.S. at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. Jackson, 672 P.2d at 260 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 261.
209. Id. (both emphases added).

Summer 2015

Thirty Years Too Long

"[T]he United States Supreme Court," he continued, "has no business contravening the final decisions of a state judiciary where no
federal right guaranteed to all citizens has been offended." 2 10 In his
conclusion, Justice Sheehy called for the Montana Supreme Court
to solve this problem by refusing to abide by the U.S. Supreme
Court's pronouncements. 211 This scenario, in which a state high
court judge reacted "rather bitterly" 21 2 to what he perceived as the
U.S. Supreme Court exceeding its jurisdictional boundaries, illustrates how illogical the Long Court's goal of respecting the state
high courts 21 3 by presuming that their decisions are reviewable
truly is. In fact, the presumption has produced exactly the opposite
effects on federal-state comity.
v.

Long's PotentialTo Undermine the U.S.
Supreme Court'sAuthority

Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of the Long presumption's negative effect on comity its potential to undermine the U.S.
Supreme Court's authority in the event that the state courts refuse
to respect and abide by its decisions. For example, suppose the
Court grants certiorari, reviews and vacates or reverses the decision of a state high court, and remands the case to the state court
for reconsideration in light of its opinion. Suppose, then, that the
state high court refuses to follow the Court's direction and insists
upon restoring its previous decision-the same one the U.S. Supreme Court vacated. In that event, would the U.S. Supreme Court
grant certiorari, reverse or vacate, and remand the case a second
time? Would the state high court eventually capitulate and comply
with the Court's interpretation? In this hypothetical scenario, because the state high courts are sovereign and because the U.S. Supreme Court has no external mechanism through which to enforce
210. Id.
211. Id. at 260-61 (suggesting that, to remedy the situation, the Montana Supreme Court
"could put the question to the United States Supreme Court four-square, that this State judiciary has the right to interpret its constitution in the light of federal decisions, and to go
beyond the federal decisions in granting and preserving rights to its citizens under its state
constitution").
212. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 699 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983) ("Respect for the independence of state
courts ... ha[s] been the cornerstone[ of this Court's refusal to decide cases where there is
an adequate and independent state ground. It is precisely because of this respect for state
courts ... that we do not wish to continue to decide issues of state law that go beyond the
opinion that we review, or to require state courts to reconsider cases to clarify the grounds of
their decisions."); see also Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 63 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("By refraining from deciding cases that rest on an adequate and independent state ground,
federal courts show proper respect for state courts ....
(emphasis added) (citing Long, 463
U.S. at 1040)).
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its pronouncements, 214 it is theoretically possible that the case could
bounce back and forth between these courts ad infinitum.
Unfortunately for the United States Supreme Court, this phenomenon is not relegated to the realm of the hypothetical; the issue
occasionally arises-or at least seems appealing-in actual cases.
Montana's Justice Sheehy, for example, explained in dissent that,
had he been in the majority, he would "press the issue" and "put the
question to the United States Supreme Court four-square 2 15 by "insisting that in Montana, this sovereign state can interpret its constitution to guarantee rights to its citizens greater than those guaranteed by the federal constitution."21 6 A five-to-one majority of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did have occasion to reject the U.S.
21 7
Supreme Court's analysis on remand in Pap'sA.M. v. City of Erie.
Concluding that "there is nothing that requires, or even counsels
us, to view this ordinance in the light adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court plurality," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disregarded the
U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment analysis upholding a public indecency ordinance prohibiting nude dancing. 218 Instead, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, consistent with its prior decision,
again struck the statute down as a violation of the freedom of expression under article 1, section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitu9
tion. 21
In his Van Arsdall dissent, Justice Stevens predicted this very
problem: the "friction" the Long presumption causes between the
state high courts and the U.S. Supreme Court "threaten[s] to undermine the respect on which we must depend for the faithful and
conscientious application of this Court's expositions of federal
law. '220 If the Court's authority is undermined, it could find itself
in a figurative "standoff' with its state counterparts as to the correct interpretation of the law, as its only enforcement mechanism
is the respect those courts afford to its pronouncements. Should the
sovereign state courts refuse to implement them, it would become
214. GARNER, ET AL., supra note 8, at 49 Box 2.1 (emphasizing that "the Supreme Court
has no army or police force with which to enforce its decisions").
215. Jackson, 672 P.2d at 261 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 260.
217. 812 A.2d 591 (2002).
218. Id. at 611. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to adopt the U.S. Supreme
Court's rationale because "[a] s a matter of policy, Pennsylvania citizens should not have the
contours of their fundamental rights under our charter rendered uncertain, unknowable, or
changeable, while the U.S. Supreme Court struggles to articulate a standard to govern a
similar federal question." Id.
219. Id. at 612-13. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
concluded that nude dancing was content-based expression that triggered a strict scrutiny
analysis. Id. at 612.
220. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 699 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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impossible for practitioners and citizens alike to know "what the
law is"-the American judiciary's oldest and most important func22 1
tion.
b.

Jurisdiction

As severe as the comity problems Long creates are, the presumption's most troubling implications affect another benefit of the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine: jurisdiction. In fact,
this is, "without question," the most important of the doctrine's benefits, as it ensures that the United States Supreme Court operates
within the limits prescribed by Article III of the federal Constitution. 222 State high court decisions that rest upon adequate and independent state grounds are outside this sphere and thus fall
within the exclusive jurisdictional territory of the state high courts.
Respect for the jurisdictional boundary between the U.S. Supreme
Court and its state counterparts and the division of power that it
creates is thus essential to the proper functioning of the federal system.
i.

In the Majority of Cases Remanded under Long,
State High Courts Reach the Same Result

Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the United States Supreme Court is empowered to "correct judgments, not revise opinions," or, to state it another way, "to render dispositive judgments,
not advisory opinions." 223 As Justice Jackson made clear in Herb v.
Pitcairn,the Court issues impermissible advisory opinions when it
reviews state high court cases under circumstances in which "the
same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws." 224 The most serious problem plaguing Long is that, when the U.S. Supreme Court presumes it has
jurisdiction to review a state high court case, reverses or vacates
the state court's decision, and remands the case, the state court
more often than not reaches the same decision on remand-pre225
cisely the scenario Justice Jackson warned against.

221. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is." (emphasis added)).
222. Gormley, Primer, supra note 49, at 700.
223. Camretav. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2037-38 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
224. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
225. Even before Long, state high courts showed an aversion to changing their minds in
response to U.S. Supreme Court review, often reaching the same conclusion on remand. See,
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As part of a retrospective commemorating the twentieth anniversary of Long in 2003, Matthew G. Simon conducted a survey of postLong cases that included a mix of state and federal constitutional
grounds, identifying seventeen that were reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court pursuant to the Long presumption and redecided on remand by the state high courts. 226 The state high courts
followed the U.S. Supreme Court in eight. 227 In five of the seventeen cases, however, the state courts reached a result on remand
that was inconsistent with that of the United States Supreme
Court; these courts either clarified their state analyses or openly
criticized the Court for exercising its jurisdiction under Long.228 In
the remaining four, the state high courts performed state-law analyses but happened to reach the same result as the U.S. Supreme
Court despite applying a different rationale. 22 9 Taking the latter
two groups together, in more than half of the post-Long cases decided between 1983 and 2003, the United States Supreme Court either violated the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine
outright and issued advisory opinions by reviewing cases resting
upon state grounds, or ran the risk of producing advisory opinions
but escaped without incident when the state high courts reached
the same result as the Court by coincidence.2 30 As to Long's efficacy,
Simon determined that the presumption "has not produced a
'23
bright-line conclusion. '
The cases in which the United States Supreme Court has exercised jurisdiction under the Long presumption and vacated or reversed the decision of a state high court in the decade since Simon's
study left off on January 1, 2003 demonstrate that little has
changed in the intervening decade. For the purposes of this article,
the author conducted a study similar to Simon's that sought cases
satisfying five criteria. The decisions included in the final analysis
were required to: (1) have been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
between January 1, 2003 and November 1, 2013; (2) include an original opinion by a state court of last resort that was ambiguously
grounded in both state and federal law; (3) have been reversed or
e.g., State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 675 (S.D. 1976) (affirming original decision under
state constitution).
226. Simon, supra note 9, at 977-78. The study included cases decided between July 6,
1983 (the day Michiganv. Long came down) and January 1, 2003.
227. Id. at 980-81 (discussing Meyers v. State, 457 So. 2d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
228. Id. at 981-83 (discussing, inter alia, People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556 (N.Y.
1986) (expressing polite disagreement with U.S. Supreme Court) and Commonwealth v.
Labron, 690 A.2d 228 (Pa. 1997) (openly criticizing U.S. Supreme Court)).
229. Id. at 983-84 (citing, inter alia, State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997)).
230. See id. at 982-84.
231. Id. at 971.
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vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court (either citing Long expressly or
impliedly exercising jurisdiction based on the presumption that federal law controlled); (4) have been reconsidered by the state high
court in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion or order granting
232
certiorari; and (5) involve, to some degree, a constitutional issue.
An exhaustive search revealed eleven cases in the last decade that
meet these criteria, 233 and a closer look shows that, despite the Long
Court's hope that its presumption would settle the issue, the question whether the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
review state high court decisions that involve both state and federal
law persists.
On remand, the state high courts reached the same result as in
their original decisions on at least some of the issues 2 34 in seven of
the eleven cases.2 3 5 Three of these are particularly instructive. In
236
the 2004 case of RacingAssociation of CentralIowa v. Fitzgerald,
the Iowa Supreme Court originally held that a statute that taxed
racetracks' gambling revenues at nearly twice the rate imposed on
riverboat gambling violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and the equality provision of article I, section 6 of the
Iowa Constitution.2 3 7 After the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute satisfied the Equal Protection Clause, the Iowa
Supreme Court found "no basis to change [its] earlier opinion that

232. This analysis excludes cases involving the recurring issue of whether, pursuant to
the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, a state procedural bar can prevent
U.S. Supreme Court review of habeas corpus denials.
233. Rigterink v. State, 66 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 2011); State v. Powell, 66 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 2011)
(per curiam); Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2004); State v.
Marsh, 144 P.3d 48 (Kan. 2006) (per curiam); King v. State, 76 A.3d 1035 (Md. 2013); Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 176 P.3d 1255 (Or. 2008); Herron v. Century BMW, 719 S.E.2d
640 (S.C. 2009); Brigham City v. Stuart, 122 P.3d 506 (Utah 2005); State v. Brillon, 995 A.2d
557 (Vt. 2010); State v. Recuenco, 180 P.3d 1276 (Wash. 2008) (en banc); State v. Knapp, 700
N.W.2d 899 (Wis. 2005). Herronv. Century BMWs constitutional issue was more tangential
than those of the other cases listed; it involved preemption rather than the interpretation of
constitutional provisions. 719 S.E.2d at 641.
234. State u.Marsh followed the U.S. Supreme Court on two issues and restored its original decision on two others. 144 P.3d at 48. Herron u. Century BMW was also ultimately
decided on procedural rather than substantive grounds. 719 S.E.2d at 641.
235. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1; Marsh, 144 P.3d 48; Williams, 176 P.3d at 1256-57 (adhering to its original decision on other state law grounds after the U.S. Supreme Court vacated on the grounds that due process required limitations on the imposition of punitive damages by the jury); Herron, 719 S.E.2d 640; Brillon, 995 A.2d at 561, 569-70 (expressing a
willingness to consider reexamining the case on state constitutional grounds but, due to the
inadequacy of the requested briefing on the issue and the fact that the criminal defendant
did not raise the issue in the original case, ultimately restoring its decision on other grounds
over the objections of a dissenting justice who advocated for conducting a state constitutional
analysis); Recuenco, 180 P.3d 1276; Knapp, 700 N.W.2d 899.
236. 675 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2004).
237. Id. at 3.
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the differential tax violates article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution."238

In 2005's State v. Knapp,239 the Wisconsin Supreme Court confronted on remand the issue of whether the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine applied to derivative physical evidence obtained as a
result of a Miranda violation. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's original opinion suppressing the evidence in light of its own decision in United States v. Patane,240 which
held that the doctrine did not extend to voluntary statements made
in the absence of a Mirandawarning. 241 On remand, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court conducted a thorough analysis of the history and
policy underlying article I, section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution
as well as federal and state case law and again ruled the contested
evidence inadmissible. 242 In a concurring opinion joined by the
Chief Justice and two other justices, Justice Crooks emphasized
that the majority's holding reinforced Wisconsin's willingness to afford additional protections above the federal constitutional mini243
mum in accordance with the "new federalism" movement.
In Washington v. Recuenco (Recuenco 1),244 the United States Supreme Court reversed the original decision of the Washington Supreme Court and held that a Blakely245 error, in which a sentencing
factor is not submitted to the jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey,246 could be subject

238. Id. The Iowa Supreme Court emphasized that it was conducting an independent
state constitutional analysis:
Based on our prior precedents and the sovereign nature of our state and its constitution, our court has an obligation to evaluate independently the validity-under the
Iowa Constitution-of the differential tax rates imposed on excursion boats and racetracks. When we independently consider this issue, we arrive at a conclusion different
from that reached by the Supreme Court under the federal constitution.
Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
239. 700 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. 2005).
240. 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (plurality decision).
241. Knapp, 700 N.W.2d at 901.
242. Id. at 912-18, 921. The Court declined the State's request that it interpret article I,
section 8 in lock-step with the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 914.
243. Id. at 922-24 (Crooks, J., concurring). The new judicial federalism movement, which
began in the 1970s and of which Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme Court was a
leader, espoused the view that the states are free to safeguard their citizens' liberties above
and beyond the minimum protections required by the United States Constitution. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
244. 548 U.S. 212 (2006).
245. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
246. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Recuenco, the Blakely error occurred when the criminal defendant was sentenced with a firearm enhancement when an assault with a deadly weapon
enhancement should have been applied. State v. Recuenco (Recuenco I1), 180 P.3d 1276, 1286
(Wash. 2008) (en banc) (Fairhurst, J., dissenting).
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to harmless error analysis. 247 On remand in 2008, the Washington
Supreme Court accepted dissenting Justice Stevens' invitation 248 to
reinstate its judgment. 249 The Court held that because article I,
section 21 of the Washington Constitution "provide[d] greater protection for jury trials than the federal constitution," harmless error
25
did not apply under the circumstances of the case. 0
In four cases, two of which were decided in tandem, 25 1 state high
courts whose decisions were reversed or vacated and reviewed by
the U.S. Supreme Court followed the Court on remand. 252 A closer
examination of these cases, however, reveals that these state high
courts did not simply abandon their state constitutional analyses
and blindly follow the Court for the sake of the "important need for
uniformity in federal law." 25 3 These cases demonstrate that in the
last decade, state high courts only reversed their prior decisions
where the court's interpretation of its own constitution was closely
linked to the interpretation of the federal constitution-an area in
which the United States Supreme Court is the ultimate authority. 25 4 Unlike the cases in which the state high courts reached the

247. See Recuenco , 548 U.S. at 221-22.
248. Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249. Recuenco II, 180 P.3d at 1283.
250. Id. at 1282 (citations omitted).
251. Rigterink u.State, 66 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 2011), was decided the same day as State u.
Powell, 66 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam), and relied upon Powell's rationale.
252. Rigterink, 66 So. 3d 866; Powell, 66 So. 3d 905; King v. State, 76 A.3d 1035 (Md.
2013); Brigham City v. Stuart, 122 P.3d 506 (Utah 2005).
253. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983).
254. In Rigterink u.State and State u.Powell, which were decided on the same day, the
Florida Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court's analysis of a Miranda
issue because it determined that the requirements of article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution align with those of the Fifth Amendment as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.
See Rigterink, 66 So. 3d at 904 ("[T]his Court has generally followed federal Fifth Amendment
precedent in interpreting article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution" (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Powell, 66 So. 3d at 907, 910 (explaining that "similar warnings [to those required by the Fifth Amendment] are required by the self-incrimination clause of article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution" and that its conclusions with
respect to the Miranda right of a defendant to the presence of counsel during questioning
"were no different than those set forth in prior holdings of the United States Supreme Court"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
In Maryland u.King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013), the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Maryland Supreme Court's holding that law enforcement's collection of DNA from those
arrested for certain enumerated offenses violated the Fourth Amendment. On remand in
King u.State (King I1), 76 A.3d 1035 (Md. 2013), the Maryland Supreme Court reached the
same result as the U.S. Supreme Court, concluding that because it interpreted article I, section 26 of the Maryland Constitution in pari materia with the latter Court's construction of
the Fourth Amendment, the DNA collection did not violate article I, section 26. Id. at 1042.
The state courts' decision to change course on remand in these cases can be juxtaposed
against the result in the "hybrid" case of State u.Marsh (MarshI1), 144 P.3d 48 (Kan. 2006)
(per curiam), in which the Kansas Supreme Court vacated its original decision that Kansas'
death penalty statute was prima facie unconstitutional in response to the U.S. Supreme
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same conclusion on remand, these cases, with their disproportionate reliance on federal constitutional precedent, seem to invite U.S.
Supreme Court review.
In any event, the jurisdictional problems that the Long presumption created in 1983 have persisted throughout the last decade.
Seventy years ago, the Herb v. PitcairnCourt restated what was a
long-held jurisdictional principle even then: "if the same judgment
would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of
federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion."255 Despite the all but indisputable status of this
rule, the United States Supreme Court broke it seven times between January 2003 and November 2013 in cases where it assumed
jurisdiction under Long to review state high court decisions, but the
state high court rendered the same judgment on remand. 256 These
cases demonstrate that Long's most notorious contribution-the
presumption that the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction
to review state high court decisions that rest on ambiguous
grounds-has, at best, failed to put the issue of how best to approach ambiguously grounded state high court cases to rest. At
worst, its tendency to lead the Court to stretch its jurisdictional
boundaries into impermissible territory has exacerbated the debate
by lending credence to the arguments of Long's opponents; as Justice Ginsburg predicted, "[t]he presumption is an imperfect barometer of state courts' intent. '' 257 What is clear after three decades is
that the presumption that the U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction
Court's reversal on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment issues. Id. at 48. The U.S. Supreme Court observed over Justice Stevens' dissent that the Kansas Supreme Court's original analysis centered around one of its own cases but relied heavily upon federal constitutional law. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 169 (2006). On remand, however, despite its
apparent acceptance of the U.S. Supreme Court's rationale, the Kansas Supreme Court reaffirmed its original opinion on the other issues, ultimately reaching the same outcome and
ordering a new trial on state-law grounds. Marsh II, 144 P.3d at 48.
255. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945).
256. Irrespective of the outcome, the number of cases alone in which the Court's jurisdiction to review the state high court's decision was either expressly at issue or questionable
shows that Long has not settled matters. It would have been reasonable to expect the number of such cases to drop off over time as state courts (1) adjusted to the new requirements of
Long, such as the plain statement rule, and conformed their opinions accordingly; (2) moved
their focus away from state constitutional law as the "onslaught of state constitutional decision making that presented itself in the 1970s and 1980s" began to ebb, see Gormley, Primer,
supra note 49, at 701; and (3) became more ideologically conservative, bringing state constitutional law into line with the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence. In fact, the
number of such cases has not waned. Simon's 2003 retrospective compiled seventeen cases
where the Court reexamined state courts' ambiguously grounded decisions in the twenty
years after Long-an average of 8.5 per cases per decade. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. The author of this article uncovered eleven cases in the subsequent decade. See
supra note 233 (listing cases).
257. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 31 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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in absence of a plain statement to the contrary has not achieved the
Long Court's primary objective of selecting a jurisdictional approach that ensures the "doctrinal consistency that is required
'258
when sensitive issues of federal-state relations are involved.
ii.

The Plain Statement Rule Has Proven
Ineffective

The plain statement rule itself-the second component of Long's
legacy-suffers from similar maladies. Despite Justice O'Connor's
implied assurances as to the clarity and simplicity 259 of the requirement that the state high court include a "plain statement that a
26 0
decision rests upon adequate and independent state grounds,"
the rule has proven simpler to abide by in theory than in practice.
At times, the state high courts have simply ignored the plain statement rule, 26 1 perhaps because, as Justice Ginsburg conjectured in
her Evans dissent, "[a]lthough it is easy enough for a state court to
say the requisite magic words, the court may not recognize that its
opinion triggers Long's plain statement requirement."' 26 2 Even in
the opinions that seem to comply most literally with the Long

258. Long, 463 U.S. at 1039.
259. For example, Justice O'Connor wrote that a state high court citing federal cases as
persuasive authority "need only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion."
Id. at 1041 (emphasis added).
260. Id. at 1042 (internal quotation marks omitted).
261. Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. u. Pores, 991 N.E.2d 745, 748 (Ill. 2013), is a recent
example of an ambiguously grounded case. In Hope Clinic, the Illinois Supreme Court was
asked to resolve a challenge to an Illinois statute limiting abortion rights for teenagers. Id.
at 748-49. After citing article I, section 2 of the Illinois Constitution and explaining that the
state constitution can offer additional protections beyond the federal floor, the Court began
its analysis of the plaintiffs' equal protection and due process claims by citing Illinois cases.
Id. at 765-66. The Court then abandoned this state-centered line of reasoning and cited
eleven U.S. Supreme Court cases as it announced and explained its decision upholding the
statute. Id. at 766-68 ("Finally, we find no state grounds for disregarding federal precedent
when interpreting our state constitution's due process and equal protection clauses."). Had
the rights claimant prevailed on state grounds, however, this m6lange of citations to state
and federal law would have necessitated a "plain statement" under Long.
262. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 31 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg
explained:
Application of Long's presumption depends on a whole series of "soft" requirements:
the state decision must "fairly appear" to rest "primarily" on federal law or be "interwoven" with federal law, and the independence of the state ground must be "not clear"
from the face of the state opinion. These are not self-applying concepts.
Id. at 31 (quoting PAUL M. BATOR, DANIEL J. MELTZER, PAUL J. MISHKIN, & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 552 (3d

ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER]).
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Court's dictate, the plain statement feels like an afterthought in26 3
tended to ward off U.S. Supreme Court review.
In other cases, it is unclear whether the state court's references
to independent state grounds (if, in fact, that is what they were)
complied with the requirement or not, raising questions as to
whether such statements are sufficiently "plain. '26 4 Even when
stated more clearly, state high courts sometimes bury the purported
plain statement in a footnote. 26 5 Placing the requisite statement in
the text does not necessarily remedy the problem, however. In
many instances, courts still run the risk of the statement getting
lost in the body of a bulky constitutional analysis or being mistaken
for a stylistic flourish. 266 In the most extreme example of questionable compliance with Long's plain statement rule, the New Hampshire Supreme Court attempted to issue a "blanket disclaimer" in
the hope of dispatching with the plain statement rule in perpetuity:
"We hereby make clear that when this court cites federal or other
263. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. BNSF Ry. Co., 246 P.3d 1037, 1044
(Mont. 2010) ("For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the District Court on adequate and
independent state grounds.").
264. See, e.g., State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Iowa 2010) (explaining that "while
United States Supreme Court cases are entitled to respectful consideration, we will engage
in independent analysisof the content of our state search and seizure provisions" (emphasis
added)); State v. Chenoweth, 158 P.3d 595, 600 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) ("[A]rticle I, section 7
qualitatively differs from the Fourth Amendment and in some areas provides greater protections than does the federal constitution. . . . Thus ...

this court should undertake an inde-

pendent state constitutional analysis." (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted)).
Even though these courts reference their state constitutions or processes of state constitutional interpretation as "independent" of their federal counterparts-as the Iowa Supreme
Court did fourteen times in Ochoa it is unclear whether these references would satisfy the
plain statement rule.
265. See, e.g., City of Midwest City v. House of Realty, Inc., 198 P.3d 886, 901 n.55 (Okla.
2008) (tacking on in the fifty-fifth-and final footnote the statement that "[o]ur holdings in
the consolidated appeals are based on Oklahoma law constituting separate, adequate, and
independent state grounds for our decision." (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)));
Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Muskogee Cnty. v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 651 n.19 (Okla. 2006)
(placing in a footnote the statement that its "holding in the instant cases concerns state constitutional questions based on Oklahoma law, which constitutes 'separate, adequate, and independent [state] grounds' for our decision" (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1041)); State v.
Feaster, 877 A.2d 229, 245 n.12 (N.J. 2005) ("We need not reach the federal question, having
decided this case on an independent state ground." (emphasis added)).
266. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court often places these statements-assuming they are sufficiently plain to constitute attempts to comply with the Long requirement at
all-in nondescript clauses or textual sentences. See, e.g., State v. Hess, 23 A.3d 373, 394
(N.J. 2011) ("Article I, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution... and our state-court
decisional law provide an independent state ground for our decision." (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)); State v. Branch, 865 A.2d 673, 682 (N.J. 2005) ("Because we resolve
the issue on independent state grounds, we do not need to decide the constitutional challenge
.... "); State v. Fuller, 862 A.2d 1130, 1141 (N.J. 2004) ("We now highlight those differences
and lay the foundation for our decision in this case. . . . [W]e use federal [and] other state
court opinions ... for the purpose of guidance, not as compelling the result we reach on independent state grounds." (first alteration and emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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State court opinions in construing provisions of the New Hampshire
Constitution or statutes, we rely on those precedents merely for
guidance and do not consider our results bound by those decisions. ' 26 7 No matter how creative the state high courts' attempts to
satisfy the plain statement rule have been, the rule has not, as Justice O'Connor hoped, helped to achieve Long's stated goal of avoiding the need to "place significant burdens on state courts to demonstrate the presence or absence of our jurisdiction. ' 26 8 In practice,
the Court's good intentions "ring hollow: Long simply puts the bur26 9
den of clarification on the state court in advance."
c.

Judicial Economy

Because, as has been demonstrated, the states often do not successfully shoulder the burden of making their grounds for decision
clear, the resultant need for the U.S. Supreme Court-and, almost
invariably, the state high courts on remand 270 -to re-decide cases
under Long wastes the courts' valuable time and resources and thus
frustrates judicial economy, the third benefit of the adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine. When the U.S. Supreme Court
grants certiorari and reviews a state high court decision, then remands the case to the state court, two additional rounds of decisions
are necessary. In effect, the state high court's workload with respect to a given case is doubled, and additional work is created for
the U.S. Supreme Court, which is already deluged with over 10,000
petitions for certiorari per year. 271 When the state high court decides the case the same way on remand, these extra resources are
effectively wasted, and this inefficiency has not gone unnoticed. In
his long line of dissents and concurrences advocating for judicial
restraint when the U.S. Supreme Court confronted petitions for certiorari in ambiguously grounded cases on appeal from state courts

267. State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 352 (N.H. 1983); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1,
31 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (doubting the legitimacy of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court's "blanket disclaimer").
268. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040.
269.

HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 262, at 553.

270. In the cases the author researched, when the U.S. Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction over a state high court case, the Court almost always either vacated or reversed the
decision and remanded it to the state court.
271. FrequentlyAsked Questions, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi9 (last visited May 31, 2015).
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of last resort, Justice Stevens was cognizant of the reality that neither the state courts nor the Supreme Court have the benefit of un272
limited resources and would be wise to allocate them elsewhere.
State high courts have also acknowledged that, rather than promoting finality by simply letting their original decisions stand, the
Long presumption shifts the responsibility for deciding cases back
onto the state high courts, whose resources are also limited. The
Utah Supreme Court, for example, explained that "time and expense [can be] saved by avoiding multiple trips through state and
federal appellate courts."273 As an example, Chief Justice Durham,
writing for the Court, pointed to the Immuno AG. case, in which the
New York Court of Appeals wrote, "In view of the costly, sizable
record already amassed, including hundreds of pages of briefs, no
purpose is served by compelling these parties, on this record and
these briefs, to consider another trip to Washington ....
The resources wasted by needlessly re-deciding cases at the U.S.
Supreme Court and state high court levels are not merely theoretical. The author's November 2013 search for state high court decisions on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court where the Court apparently decided the case in accordance with the Long presumption
revealed eleven such cases since 2003.275 If each opinion produced
in these cases beyond the state high court's original decision required an average of two extra months to produce, one for the U.S.
Supreme Court and one for the state high court on remand, the
number of additional months spent by the two courts combined totals twenty-two-nearly two years. The outcomes of most of these
cases remained unchanged on remand, meaning that the courts expended the majority of these extra resources in the name of reaching the exact same result. Even worse, these resources were imprudently allocated in the name of rendering advisory opinions the
272. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 203 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Although in recent years the trend has been otherwise, I continue to hope 'that a future Court
will recognize the error of this allocation of resources ... and return to our older and better
practice of restraint."' (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 1070 (Stevens, J., dissenting))); California v.
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1029 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("We granted certiorari only because at least four Members of the Court determined-as a matter of discretion-that review.., would represent a wise use of the Court's scarce resources."). This theory also formed
underlying theme of Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 407-09 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring), which he called "an odd flyspeck of a
case." Id. at 407. Because the case, which had been pending for six years, involved "minor
offenses" carrying maximum penalties of just ninety days to six months in jail, Justice Stevens could "see no reason for this Court to cause the Utah courts to redecide the question as
a matter of state law." Id. at 407, 409.
273. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1005 n.6 (Utah 1994).
274. Id. (quoting Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1278-79 (N.Y. 1991)).
275. See supra notes 232-233 and accompanying text.
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Court was not permitted to deliver in the first place. Ultimately,
this constitutes a waste of the courts' valuable time and resources,
276
which could have been better spent on other tasks.
Ten years ago, Matthew Simon analyzed the post-Long body of
case law and reached some disheartening conclusions. Long, with
its presumption and plain statement rule, did not significantly reduce the number of advisory opinions and did not always effectively
demonstrate respect for the state courts' independence. Many state
courts did not comply with the plain statement rule, and, perhaps
most importantly, "t]he Court continues to take cases that it should
not."277 "[1]f state courts continue to fail to abide by Long," Simon
theorized, "then the case has not 'achieve[d] the consistency that is
278
necessary' [and] that the Supreme Court had sought."
The cases of the last decade continue to serve as examples of
Long's ineffectiveness. With the plain statement required by the
U.S. Supreme Court often ignored, hidden, or used as a sort of disclaimer by state courts hoping to shield their decisions from review,
the Court continues to presume-often incorrectly-that it has jurisdiction over state high court decisions involving a mix of state
and federal grounds. Furthermore, where the state high courts'
grounds for decision are truly ambiguous-that is, not relying almost exclusively upon federal law-these courts invariably reinstitute on remand the decisions that the U.S. Supreme Court vacated
or reversed in order to assume jurisdiction pursuant to Long. The
net result is that, in addition to endangering comity and wasting
resources, Long too often leads the Court to render advisory opinions. The thirty-plus years since the Court instituted the Long pre'
sumption have done nothing to remedy these "vexing issue[s]. "279
Rather, Long has only replaced the threat of inconsistency in federal law with another set of problems: damaged comity, squandered

276. Efficient resource management is even more critical in today's challenging economic
conditions, which the state and federal courts have struggled to navigate. See Lita Epstein,
Courts in Crisis: Recession Drives Caseloads Up, Budgets Down, DAILYFINANCE (Dec. 28,
2009, 9:33 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/12/28/courts-in-crisis-recession-drivescaseloads-up-budgets-down/; Amanda Robert, California Courts Continue Cuts, Closures,
LEGAL NEWSLINE (June 17, 2013, 1:05 PM), http://legalnewsline.com/issues/tort-reform/242312-california-courts-continue-cuts-closures; Jennifer Smith, Federal Courts 'Crisis'
Seen Due to Cuts, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2013, 9:39 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324123004579057520168095380; Richard Wolf, Federal Courts
Can't Pay Court-Appointed Lawyers, USA TODAY (Sept. 17, 2013, 3:28 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/09/17/federal-courts-budget-cuts-lawyers/2827843/.
277. Simon, supra note 9, at 988.
278. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1983)).
279. Long, 463 U.S. at 1038.
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judicial resources, and, most importantly, stretching the Court's jurisdiction beyond its bounds and into the verboten territory of the
advisory opinion. "I am confident that a future Court will recognize
the error of this allocation of resources," Justice Stevens wrote in
his Long dissent. 280 "When that day comes, I think it likely that the
Court will also reconsider the propriety of today's expansion of our
jurisdiction. '28 1 After an unsuccessful trial period spanning three
decades, the day Justice Stevens hoped for is long overdue.
B.

The Solution: Abandon the Long Presumption in Favor of the
'Modern Federalism"Approach

As this article demonstrates, Long's failings lead to one inevitable
conclusion: the Court must abandon the Long presumption and its
accompanying plain statement rule. Implementing this solution to
the Long problem, however, is not as simple as merely overruling
the decision. With what approach to ambiguously grounded cases
should the United States Supreme Court replace Long? If the Court
adopts any of its previous approaches, how will it address that approach's shortcomings?
Once the Court overturns Long, it should return to its earliest
historical approach and instead presume that, where the state high
court's grounds for decision are unclear, the decision rests upon adequate and independent state grounds. It should, therefore, presume that it has no jurisdiction to review the case and decline to
grant certiorari, thus ensuring that it errs on the proper side of its
jurisdictional limits. The Court's return to this approach does not
mean, however, that it must also return to the problems that led it
to abandon the presumption in favor of adequate and independent
state grounds: namely, that state courts' erroneous interpretations
of federal law are allowed to persist, compromising the uniformity
of the U.S. Supreme Court's own federal jurisprudence. In order to
mitigate this problem, the Court could include a simple disclaimer
in its denials of certiorari on the basis of adequate and independent
state grounds to indicate that the state court's opinion lacks precedential value to the extent that it relies upon federal law. This "adequate and independent state grounds disclaimer" makes no new
law; to the contrary, it is consistent with some of the nation's oldest
federalism principles.
The state high courts can reinforce this effort-and help to ensure
that their state constitutional decisions are properly protected from
280.
281.

Id. at 1070 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
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U.S. Supreme Court review-by adopting the "modern federalism"
approach to the analysis of state constitutional issues. Under modern federalism, a state high court should make a reasonable, goodfaith effort, as its docket and resources permit, to conduct a thorough independent state constitutional analysis before moving on to
issues of federal law, which should only be analyzed when necessary
to resolve the case. If a federal law analysis is necessary, the court
should locate it in a separate section of the opinion in order to ensure that the state and federal grounds for decision are clear and
unambiguous. In order to promote the state high court's long-term
compliance with the modern federalism approach, it should
strongly encourage litigants to compose and structure their briefs
accordingly. By shifting the responsibility for framing and thoroughly researching these issues onto the litigants, a state high court
can reap the benefits of modern federalism without imposing an unreasonable-and ultimately unmanageable-workload upon itself.
Working in concert, these two proposed solutions, the U.S. Supreme Court's adequate and independent state grounds disclaimer
and the state high courts' litigant-assisted modern federalism approach, will not only fill the post-Long void. Beyond remedying the
problems presented by Long, they will actually enhance the workings of the federal system by fostering a mutually respectful and
symbiotic balance between the United States Supreme Court and
its state counterparts.
1.

The U.S. Supreme Court's Role: Overturn Long

The first step that must be taken in order to avoid the problems
Long has caused and maximize the benefits that the adequate and
independent state grounds doctrine offers is that the United States
Supreme Court must abandon Long. Stare decisis, while generally
important to the stability of and respect for the Court's pronouncements, does not require the Court to slavishly follow its prior decisions when they are no longer viable. As Justice Kennedy explained
in Lawrence v. Texas, 28 2 "The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to
the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the sta28 3
bility of the law. It is not, however, an inexorable command."
Instead, stare decisis "is a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision." 28 4 The Court has
282. 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003).
283. Id.
284. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S.
106, 119 (1940)).
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acknowledged that, "when governing decisions are unworkable or
are badly reasoned, 'this Court has never felt constrained to follow
precedent."'' 28 5 Such is the case here. Long has not accomplished
its stated goals and, at the same time, it has created a host of unanticipated and unwelcome side effects.
a.

Presume State High Court Cases Rest upon
Adequate and Independent State Grounds

Once Long has been overruled, the United States Supreme Court
should return to its earliest precedent on the issue and adopt the
opposite presumption: in cases where the state high court decision
it is asked to review is ambiguously grounded, the Court should
presume that it lacks jurisdiction. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
have advocated for this approach on various occasions. Justice Stevens expressed a desire for a "return to [the Court's] older and better practice of restraint" on multiple occasions over the course of
more than a quarter-century. 28 6 In her dissent in Evans, Justice
Ginsburg also argued in favor of judicial restraint when confronted
with this type of jurisdictional issue, writing, "I would apply the opposite presumption and assume that Arizona's Supreme Court has
ruled for its own State and people, under its own constitutional
recognition of individual security against unwarranted state intrusion. ' 28 7 In order to implement this new presumption, the United
States Supreme Court should not grant certiorari in ambiguously
grounded state high court cases, as Justice Stevens repeatedly rec288
ommended.
285. Id. at 827 (citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)). The Court's prerogative to depart from the doctrine of stare decisis extends to this issue. In Long, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that the Court is "free to consider as a fresh proposition
whether we may take presumptive jurisdiction over the decisions of sovereign states." 463
U.S. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
286. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 203 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brigham
City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 409 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I continue to believe
that a policy of judicial restraint-one that allows other decisional bodies to have the last
word in legal interpretation until it is truly necessary for this Court to intervene-enables
this Court to make its most effective contribution to our federal system of government." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Long, 463 U.S. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[A] policy
of judicial restraint . . .enables this Court to make its most effective contribution to our
federal system of government.").
287. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 24 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
288. See, e.g., Florida v. Rigterink, 559 U.S. 965 (2010) (granting certiorari, vacating judgment, and remanding for reconsideration in light of Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50 (2010))
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Because the independence of the state-law ground is 'clear from
the face of the opinion,' . . . we do not have power to vacate the judgment of the Florida

Supreme Court." (citation to Long omitted)); Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 223
(2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]here was surely no need to reach out to decide this case.");
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 409 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[W]hile I join the Court's
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The primary failing of the Long presumption is that it "allocates
the risk of error in favor of the Court's power of review; as a result,
over the long run the Court will inevitably review judgments that
in fact rest on adequate and independent state grounds."28 9 The
United States Supreme Court can avoid this scenario and instead
err on the side of safety by presuming that an ambiguously
grounded state high court decision rests upon adequate and independent state grounds and declining to grant certiorari in cases
290
where its opinion is likely to be advisory.
It follows that the Court should also abandon Long's plain statement rule, which has largely proven ineffective. Some states ignore
it entirely, whether out of a lack of awareness of the United States
Supreme Court's requirement or the level of detail needed to satisfy
it, or, more problematically, in defiance of the Court's pronouncement. 291 Still others, such as New Hampshire, have used it as an
opportunity to reassert their sovereignty in the face of a direct dictate from the U.S. Supreme Court.292 In her Evans dissent, Justice
Ginsburg advocated for a presumption in favor of adequate and independent state grounds but added an additional requirement: "I
would presume, absent a plain statement to the contrary, that a
state court's decision of the kind here at issue rests on an independent state-law ground."2 93 It is not necessary, however, to insist on
the inclusion of such a "plain statement." For one sovereign court
to impose detailed requirements as to the form, content, and style
of the written opinions of another exceeds the bounds of the former's
authority and infringes upon the latter's. 294 Thus, the less formalistic approach offered by Justice Sheehy of the Montana Supreme
Court, namely, that "adequate state grounds for [the state court's]
opinion, I remain persuaded that my vote to deny the State's petition for certiorari was correct."); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1031 (1983) ("I repeat, no rule of law commanded
the Court to grant certiorari.").
289. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 698-99 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
290. Another benefit is that this approach forecloses the possibility that states will attempt to engage in self-help on remand. After proposing the solution the author suggests,
Montana's Justice Sheehy wrote, "We should at least attempt to force the United States Supreme Court to come to that proper stance." State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 261 (Mont. 1983)
(Sheehy, J., dissenting). For the Court to adopt the "proper stance" of its own volition would
alleviate the need for the states to take matters into their own hands.
291. See supra Parts III.A.2.a.iii (discussing the plain statement rule's inability to remedy
Long's comity problems) and III.A.2.b.ii (discussing the plain statement rule's compliance
issues).
292. See State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 352 (N.H. 1983) (issuing a blanket disclaimer that all
of its future decisions on issues of state law that cite both federal and state grounds rest upon
adequate and independent state grounds).
293. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 26 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
294. This assumption pervades the discussions of the Long "plain statement" rule in Part
JJJ.A supra.
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decision are independent of federal grounds unless it clearly appears from the state's opinion otherwise, 295 is preferable.
b. Include a Disclaimer in Denials of Certiorarion
Adequate and Independent State Grounds
This does not mean, however, that the United States Supreme
Court must reinstitute the same laissez-faire approach that led it
to abandon the presumption against reviewing state high court decisions in the first place. After all, the threat of allowing state
courts' erroneous interpretations of federal law to infect the federal
corpus juris is the most troubling drawback of the presumption
against review. 296 In Herb v. Pitcairn, Justice Jackson aptly
acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court's "only power over state
judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. 2 9 7
Importantly, however, this observation does not automatically
compel the Court to exercise its "power ... to correct wrong judg-

ments" on the part of the state courts. 298 Instead, where a petition
for certiorari requests review of a state high court decision that contains both adequate and independent state grounds and federal
grounds, the United States Supreme Court should deny the petition-subject to the disclaimer that the state court's analysis with
respect to federal law is not precedential. The Court need not tailor
this caveat to the individual case at hand; rather, it need only include the following verbiage in its order denying certiorari:
Petition for writ of certiorari to the [state high court] denied on
the basis of adequate and independent state grounds. The decision of the [state high court] is not precedential to the extent
that it is based upon grounds of federal law.
This "adequate and independent state grounds" disclaimer creates no new law. It merely makes clear the practical effects of the
state of the law as it has stood since the nineteenth century: state

295. Jackson, 672 P.2d at 261 (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
296. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983) (cautioning that "outright dismissal
of cases is clearly not a panacea because it cannot be doubted that there is an important need
for uniformity in federal law, and that this need goes unsatisfied when we fail to review an
opinion that rests primarily upon federal grounds and where the independence of an alleged
state ground is not apparent from the four corners of the opinion." (emphasis in original)).
297. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
298. Id. at 126.
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high court decisions with respect to issues of federal law are reviewable by the Court,2 99 while state high court decisions based upon
30 0
adequate and independent state grounds are not.
The disclaimer is in no way intended to signal disapproval of the
state high court's opinion on the part of the United States Supreme
Court. Like the United States Supreme Court's other denials of
certiorari, which indicate only that the customary four justices did
not vote to hear the case, 30 1 the disclaimer means absolutely nothing with respect to the merits of the state high court's decision. The
United States Supreme Court has "often stated" that its "denial of
a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits
of the case," and this principle applies equally to any accompanying
opinions. 30 2 The same is true of a single sentence reminding practitioners of a jurisdictional principle that has been undisputed for
30 3
nearly two centuries.
For the adequate and independent state grounds disclaimer to be
truly effective in practice, however, it must attract the notice-and
earn the trust-of legal practitioners and courts. While it is common knowledge that "denial of certiorari is not the equivalent of an
affirmance,"' 30 4 the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged
the reality that, "[a]lthough denial of certiorari is not to be taken as
expression of opinion in any case, it would be idle to claim that it
has no actual or reasonable influence upon the practical judgment
of lawyers .... "305 For this reason, the effects of the Court's denial
of certiorari on the basis of adequate and independent state
grounds, i.e., that the state high court's opinion lacks precedential
value with respect to federal law, must be obvious to lawyers and
courts in order to ensure that they conduct their respective briefing
and opinion writing accordingly.
Because of the prevalence of large legal databases such as
Westlaw, LexisNexis, and Bloomberg Law, they are the logical
place to start. As is commonly done for unreported opinions, which

299.
300.

See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 342 (1816).
See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 636 (1874).

301.

DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 215

(9th ed. 2011).
302. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (quoting United States v. Carver, 260 U.S.
482, 490 (1923) (Holmes, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
303. See Martin, 14 U.S. at 342.
304. Kemp v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 33 N.W.2d 569, 589 (Iowa 1948).
305. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 192 (1947) (observing that lawyers can be expected to
look to a denial of certiorari as an indication of whether litigants should petition the U.S.
Supreme Court for certiorari in similar cases in the future).

540

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 53

also implicate a case's precedential value, 30 6 when a user opens the
document containing the state high court decision that the United
States Supreme Court has declined to review on the basis of adequate and independent state grounds, the top of the page should
feature the following text:
This decision is not precedential to the extent that it relies
upon grounds of federal law. See [citation to order of United
States Supreme Court denying certiorari].
Unlike the distinction between unpublished and published cases
in terms of precedential value, which is usually a matter internal
to a court or, at the very least, within a state's court system, 30 7 denials of certiorari based on adequate and independent state grounds
span two sovereign court systems, often take a period of several
years to develop, and raise important federalism issues that imperil
the courts' jurisdictional bounds, comity, and efficiency.
For this reason, a denial of certiorari under these circumstances
should be specifically flagged in the legal database's citator. Assigning the state high court case an orange flag would be particularly apt, as the state high court decision that the United States
Supreme Court declined to review has research implications in common with cases to which the legal databases currently assign "yellow flags" and "red flags." A case in which certiorari is denied on
the basis of adequate and independent state grounds is, to some
degree, both: it is "yellow" in the sense that the user must proceed
with caution, as a portion of the opinion might lack precedential

306. See, e.g., Chester v. Comm'r of Pa. Dep't of Corr., 598 F. App'x 94 (3d Cir. 2015) (unpublished). Lexis Advance places the following text underneath the case caption:
Notice: NOT PRECEDENTIAL OPINION UNDER THIRD CIRCUIT INTERNAL
OPERATING PROCEDURE RULE 5.7. SUCH OPINIONS ARE NOT REGARDED
AS PRECEDENTS WHICH BIND THE COURT. PLEASE REFER TO FEDERAL
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE RULE 32.1 GOVERNING THE CITATION
TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.
Id.
While the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that the federal courts "may
not prohibit or restrict" litigants from citing unpublished opinions, FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (a), in
some states, whether a case is published determines whether it can be cited at all. See, e.g.,
210 PA. CODE § 65.37 (2012) ("An unpublished memorandum decision shall [generally] not
be relied upon or cited by a Court or a party in any other action or proceeding .... ); see also
Boring v. Erie Ins. Grp., 641 A.2d 1189, 1191 (1994) (reversing trial court on the grounds
that the lone decision upon which it relied was "an unreported memorandum decision of this
Court and as such has no precedential value" (citing Pa. Super. Ct. I.O.P. 444 B)). Designation of a case as published versus unpublished can also affect a court's decision to cite to it.
See, e.g., 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7 ("The court by tradition does not cite to its not precedential opinions as authority.").
307. See supra note 306.
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value, and "red" in that, to the extent the court does in fact analyze
federal law, those portions must be treated as non-precedential.
It is important to note that the use of this disclaimer and its accompanying citator flag is appropriate only where the United States
Supreme Court declines review of state high court decisions on the
basis of adequate and independent state grounds. A mere fleeting
reference to state grounds in the state high court's opinion will not
do. In the case that ultimately led to Michigan v. Long, for example,
the Michigan Supreme Court mentioned its state constitution only
three times in its opinion, with two of those references in footnotes
and the other in its holding "that the deputies' search of the [defendant's] vehicle was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and art[.] 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution. ' 30 8 The only other reference to state law was a citation to
a state case in the final footnote. 30 9 Under these circumstances, the
United States Supreme Court's decision to presume that the Michigan Supreme Court's decision rested upon federal grounds was not
unreasonable. As Dean Gormley explains, "Only certain pronouncements by the state courts under their own constitutions will
be 'shielded' from federal review, thus allowing them to exist in sep3 10
arate pockets without the intrusion of the U.S. Supreme Court."
If the state high court fails to make a good-faith effort to demonstrate that its decision rests upon adequate and independent state
grounds by conducting a thorough analysis of the state issue, it cannot expect to "shield" its decision from Supreme Court review by
simply referencing its state constitution, statutes, and case law in
passing.
Nor is the disclaimer meant as an affront to the competence of
the state courts or as a diminishment of their position in the federal
system. State high courts are the ultimate arbiters of state law,
whereas the United States Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter
of federal law. In the event that a state high court's decisions wade
into federal territory, it is no insult to that court for the United
States Supreme Court to remind practitioners that the state court's
opinion as to federal law lacks precedential value. Just as the presumption that ambiguously grounded decisions rest upon state
grounds prevents the U.S. Supreme Court from encroaching upon
the state high courts' jurisdiction with respect to state law, the state
high courts must also respect their federal counterpart's jurisdiction with respect to federal law.
308.
309.
310.

People v. Long, 320 N.W.2d 866, 869 n.4, 870 & n.8 (Mich. 1982).
Id. at 870 n.8.
Gormley, Primer, supra note 49, at 699.
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The State High Courts'Role:Adopt the 'Modern
Federalism"Approach

Under the modern federalism approach, the state courts are not
required to simply stand aside while the United States Supreme
Court unilaterally determines whether their decisions contain adequate and independent state grounds sufficient to render its review
improper. To the contrary, the effective resolution of the issues
Long attempted to address will not just require action on the part
of the U.S. Supreme Court. The state high courts will also need to
take a proactive role in reinforcing their own sovereignty once Long
is jettisoned. Long's rejection of the presumption that ambiguously
grounded state high court decisions rest on adequate and independent state grounds was rooted in the fear that errors committed by
the state courts in their interpretations of federal law would go uncorrected, thus frustrating the "important need for uniformity in
federal law."31 1 The state courts, however, are better positioned
than the U.S. Supreme Court to solve this problem, because they
have the ability to prevent their opinions that rest upon adequate
and independent state grounds from becoming ambiguously
grounded-and thus potentially vulnerable to U.S. Supreme Court
review-in the first place.
The states can help to accomplish the Long Court's stated goal of
uniformity in federal law by adopting the "modern federalism" analysis proposed in this article as their preferred analytical approach
to cases requiring an examination of state and federal constitutional precedent. In addition to the abandonment of Long, modern
federalism requires the state courts to take appropriate steps to
protect their state constitutional decisions from federal review. In
a perfect world, the primacy principle, in which a state high court
reaches the federal issue only in the event that a rights claimant
does not prevail under the state's statutory law and constitution
(which are examined first and second, respectively), would be the
ideal means by which to ensure that state high courts' decisions
tread into federal-law territory only when necessary. In practice,
however, the benefits of primacy have proven to be elusive.
The modern federalism approach addresses the primacy principle's shortcomings by enlisting the help of the litigants themselves.
Modern federalism requires state high courts to do two things: (1)
make a good-faith effort to conduct an independent state constitutional analysis priorto addressing federal constitutional issues, and
311.

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983).

Summer 2015

Thirty Years Too Long

(2) strongly encourage litigants to analyze state constitutional issues in their briefing in order to furnish the court with the "raw
materials" necessary to perform its own analysis. In this way, the
litigants are incentivized to assist the state high court's effort to
analyze issues in the proper order where practical and, more importantly, to keep their state and federal analyses separate and the
bases for their decisions clear. By pooling their efforts in this symbiotic manner, litigants and courts can realize the true benefits of
modern federalism: a practical, efficient, and sustainable solution
by which state courts can help the U.S. Supreme Court maintain
the delicate balance of judicial power in the federal system while
building, over time, their own independent bodies of state constitutional law.
a.

The Theoretical Ideal: The PrimacyPrinciple

Scholars have previously identified four major approaches to
state constitutional interpretation by state courts: interstitial, dual
sovereignty, lockstep, and primacy. 312 Under the interstitial approach, a court presumes federal law controls, and state constitutional issues are only reached if federal law is insufficient to resolve
the case. 313 The dual sovereignty approach requires a court to analyze both state and federal grounds even where the federal grounds
are sufficient to resolve the case. 314 Under the lockstep approach,
the state's interpretation of its own constitution is directly linked to
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. 31 5 Under the primacy approach, "a state court looks first
to state constitutional law, develops independent doctrine and precedent, and decides federal questions only when state law is not dis31 6
positive."
Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court, a leading advocate
31 7
of the primacy approach to state constitutional interpretation,

312. See JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
1.04 (1st ed.1993).

LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL

313. See id. 1.06[3].
314. See id. 1.04[4].
315. See id. 1.06[2].
316. West. v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1005-06 (Utah 1994) (quoting Christine M. Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah Courts, UTAH B.J., Nov. 1989,
at 26).
317. Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael E. Ahrens, The Legacy of Hans Linde in the Statutory andAdministrativeAge, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 175, 175 (2007) ("Hans Linde has been
the poster child for state courts to interpret their laws independently of the U.S. Supreme
Court's interpretation of parallel provisions in the federal Constitution, while still adhering
to the doctrine of federal supremacy.").
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summarized its mechanics in his argument that "[t]he proper sequence is to analyze the state's law, including its constitutional law,
before reaching a federal constitutional claim."3 18 In conducting a
primacy analysis, a state court first analyzes state statutory law; if
the state action facing a constitutional challenge is unlawful, the
31 9
analysis ends there, without reaching the constitutional claims.
If the second step is necessary, the court proceeds to an analysis of
state constitutional claims. Justice Linde explained that this is "because the state does not deny any right claimed under the federal
Constitution when the claim before the court in fact is fully met by
state law."320 If the challenged action violates the state constitution, the analysis ends; there is no need to analyze the claim under
the federal Constitution, because state constitutions must provide
their citizens' liberties at least as much protection as the U.S. Constitution. 321 If the state constitution does not prohibit the challenged action, however, the third step-an analysis of the claim under the federal Constitution-becomes necessary because "if the
state constitution affords lesser protection than the U.S. Constitution, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution prevents enforcement of the lesser state level of constitutional protection and
322
requires application of the federal standard."
In cases involving a mix of federal and state constitutional
grounds, the primacy principle theoretically provides the most foolproof approach by which to further minimize the risks of confusion
on the part of the United States Supreme Court and, more importantly, erroneous interpretations of federal law by the state high
courts. This approach also helps to ensure that the state courts of

318. Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981) (en banc) (emphasis added).
319. John W. Shaw, Comment, PrincipledInterpretationsof State ConstitutionalLawWhy Don't the 'Primacy'States Practice Uhat They Preach?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1019, 1038
(1993) (citing State v. Bridewell, 759 P.2d 1054, 1059 (Or. 1988)).
320. Sterling, 625 P.2d at 126.
321. Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 980 (1985). Justice Pollock, formerly of the New Jersey Supreme Court, explained that the United States
Constitution's Bill of Rights "establish[es] a foundation for the protection of human liberty.
A state may not undermine that foundation, but its constitution may build additional protections above the federal floor." Id.
322. Shaw, supra note 319, at 1026. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI,cl. 2.
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last resort remain the ultimate arbiters of state constitutional issues, thus keeping the sovereign state high courts operating within
the bounds of their respective areas of expertise. 323 Justice Marshall emphasized the importance of leaving state issues to the state
high courts several years before Long, writing in his dissent in the
324
1975 case of Oregon v. Hass:
[I]t seems much the better policy to permit the state court the
freedom to strike its own balance between individual rights and
police practices,at least where the state court's ruling violates
no constitutional prohibitions. It is peculiarly within the competence of the highest court of a State to determine that in its
jurisdiction the police should be subject to more stringent rules
325
than are required as a federal constitutional minimum.
Because the primacy principle's order of analysis requires that "a
state supreme court address[] state constitutional issues before
moving to issues under the Federal Constitution,"' 326 it is the ideal
approach by which to effectuate Justice Marshall's "better policy."
Unfortunately for the primacy principle and its esteemed advocates, however, the "ideal" nature of the primacy principle has also
been its downfall. Despite its great promise, the primacy approach
has proven too unwieldy, cumbersome, and time-consuming in practice to use on a consistent basis. Not surprisingly, the major hurdle
preventing the widespread and consistent application of the primacy principle among state high courts has been compliance. The
Utah Supreme Court provides an interesting case study. In the
1994 case of West v. Thomson Newspapers,327 in which then-Justice
Durham, a primacy advocate, wrote for the majority, the Court
acknowledged that it had been criticized for apparently lacking a
consistent approach in its constitutional decisions. 328 In response,
the Court instituted the primacy principle in West but seemed to

323. Justice Stevens lamented what he believed to be his Court's transgression of this
boundary in Californiav. Ramos, decided the same day as Long, when he queried in dissent,
"Why, I ask with all due respect, did not the Justices who voted to grant certiorari in this
case allow the wisdom of state judges to prevail in California... ?" 463 U.S. 992, 1031 (1983)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
324. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
325. Id. at 728 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
326. State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 821 (Iowa 2013) (emphasis added).
327. 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994).
328. Id. at 1004-05.
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leave the door open to limiting its reach to the context of that particular case. 329 The Utah Supreme Court followed the primacy approach intermittently for over a decade, 330 but has departed from it
in recent years. 331 Former Chief Justice Durham, however, has con332
tinued to lobby for its consistent use.
Even the Oregon Supreme Court, which took the lead in adopting
the primacy approach in Justice Linde's majority opinion in the
1981 case of Sterling v. Cupp, 333 has had difficulty adhering to the
principle. 334 A study conducted by scholar John Shaw in the early
1990s showed that Oregon's Supreme Court applied its pure primacy approach far less faithfully than it purported to. 335 In fact,
Shaw's analysis revealed that "[t]he frequency of primacy practice
varies in all dimensions; no pattern in the application of the primary approach appears according to constitutional issue or Oregon
justice. '336 Shaw concluded that state constitutionalism in itself
was not the cause of non-compliance with the primacy principle; rather, "constitutional practice, electoral pressures and judicial disin337
terest in certain issues" were to blame.
329. Id. at 1006 ("In the present context, we are persuaded that the primacy model is the
best method to address the interests at stake.") (emphasis added).
330. See, e.g., State v. Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106, 1113 (Utah 2007) ("[1]t is part of the
inherent logic of federalism that state law be interpreted independently and priorto consideration of federal questions." (emphasis in original)); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248
(Utah 1998) ("[W]hen a party asserts claims under both the Utah and federal Constitutions,
this court ordinarily first determines the issue under the Utah Constitution and only resorts
to the federal Constitution if the state constitution is not dispositive.").
331. See State v. Ott, 247 P.3d 344, 357 (Utah 2010); State v. Briggs, 199 P.3d 935 (Utah
2008).
332. See, e.g., Ott, 247 P.3d at 357 (Durham, CA., concurring) ("Structurally, I believe this
court should determine first whether state law has been complied with before addressing
claims that the federal Constitution has been violated."); Briggs, 199 P.3d at 948-49
(Durham, CA., concurring) ("I concur in the result of the majority opinion, and have no quarrel with its analysis of the federal due process question. I believe, however, that in addressing the federal constitutional challenge before the state constitutional challenge, the opinion
overlooks the proper order of analysis."). Chief Justice Durham also took to the scholarly
literature to advocate for more widespread acceptance of the primacy principle. See, e.g.,
Christine M. Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah Courts, UTAH B.J., Nov.
1989, at 25-26; see generally Sin6ad McLoughlin, Choosinga "Primacy"Approach:ChiefJustice Christine M. Durham Advocating States Rights in Our FederalistSystem, 65 ALB.L. REV.
1161 (2002).
333. 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981) (en banc).
334. Shaw, supra note 319, at 1048-49 ("This study demonstrates that even one of the
leading New Federalist jurisdictions can fail to live up to the expectations created by New
Federalism.").
335. Id. at 1043-48.
336. Id. at 1043.
337. Id. at 1021. Utah and Oregon are not alone. In fact, Dean Gormley has come to a
rather disheartening conclusion: "The blunt truth is that virtually no state court has been
able to adhere to a single state constitutional methodology, once announced." Ken Gormley,
The Pennsylvania Constitution after Edmunds, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 55, 73 (1993) [hereinafter Gormley, The Pennsylvania Constitution].
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Shaw's "electoral pressures" argument is a sensible one, as state
judges, unlike their federal counterparts, are generally elected and
do not enjoy the security of lifetime appointments. Rather, as Dean
Gormley points out, because state judges must "play musical chairs
on a regular basis," their courts' "state constitutional approaches
and philosophies are bound to be juggled" as well, "leading to a
built-in inability to maintain consistency. ' 338 "Constitutional practice" and "judicial disinterest" are also logical causes of state high
courts' noncompliance with the primacy principle, 339 and the latter
logically flows from the former. Litigants often fail to adequately
brief state constitutional issues. For example, Justice Linde chastised the petitioner in a 1980 Oregon Supreme Court case for failing
to identify the specific constitutional provision he was invoking, as
well as the vagueness of his assertion that the statute in question
was "constitutionally impermissible" under the unnamed provision. 340 Similarly, in a 2010 case before the Vermont Supreme
Court on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Vermont Supreme Court initially requested briefing on the state constitutional
issues involved; however, it ultimately deemed those issues waived
due to the inadequacy of the briefs it received, coupled with the fact
341
that the parties had not raised those issues in prior proceedings.
b.

"Modern Federalism"A Workable Solution

Given the inadequate information with which state high court
judges are furnished in instances such as these, it is no wonder that
342
they have displayed "disinterest" in state constitutional issues.
State high courts, with their crowded dockets and busy argument
schedules, can hardly be expected to greet the prospect of conducting a state constitutional analysis with enthusiasm when litigants
fail to frame the issues properly or provide the case law and historical background information necessary to guide the courts' research. This is especially true given that "a complete body of state
constitutional jurisprudence [is not] created overnight, by one generation of Justices and law clerks, when that niche of case law and
'343
history has languished for two centuries.

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Gormley, The Pennsylvania Constitution, supra note 337, at 73.
Shaw, supra note 319, at 1021.
Megdal v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 605 P.2d 273, 274-75 (Or. 1980).
State v. Brillon, 995 A.2d 557, 561, 569-70 (Vt. 2010).
See Shaw, supranote 319, at 1021.
Gormley, The Pennsylvania Constitution, supra note 337, at 75.
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Unlike the primacy principle in its pure form, the modern federalism approach accounts for this reality. Due to the dearth of existing state constitutional case law and the demands of their dockets,
state high courts cannot realistically be expected to conduct a thorough analysis of every state constitutional issue a case may present-especially when the litigants themselves fail to raise them.
Nor are all state constitutional issues that could be raised equally
deserving of the state high courts' time and resources. For example,
Dean Gormley has termed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's approach to state constitutional cases "selective primacy" because
that court only conducts a thorough state constitutional analysis
"when an issue grabs its attention and sets off a bell that says 'this
issue should be permanently boxed in under the state constitution."' 344
Modern federalism incorporates the same sense of pragmatism. Assuming the United States Supreme Court abandons Long in favor of a
return to the presumption that ambiguously grounded state high court
decisions are based upon adequate and independent state grounds, the
primacy approach offers a valuable advantage: mitigating that presumption's tendency to allow state high courts' erroneous interpretations of federal law to persist. That benefit can be realized, however,
without conducting a thorough analysis of every single state constitutional issue a case presents. Under the modern federalism approach,
two important facets of the primacy principle should be retained: (1)
the order in which the state and federal analyses are conducted, and (2)
the fact that the two analyses are kept separate in the court's opinion.
Where state constitutional materials are not available, the court's time
and resources are limited, and/or the state happens to follow a lockstep
approach toward a particular provision of its own constitution, the burdens of conducting a detailed analysis under the state's constitution
might outweigh the benefits.
Under the modern federalism approach, the court should, however,
make a reasonable attempt to conduct a reasonably thorough state constitutional analysis in good faith whenever practicable. That is, it
should not merely insert references to its state constitution and case law
into an otherwise predominantly federal analysis as an afterthoughtor in a deliberate attempt to insulate its decision from U.S. Supreme

344. Id.; see also Thomas M. Hardiman, New JudicialFederalism and the Pennsylvania
Experience: Reflections on the Edmunds Decision, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 503, 523 (2009) (describing
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's approach).
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Court review. It should instead conduct an independent state-law analysis before moving on to any federal constitutional analysis, and it
should attempt as far as possible to refrain from conducting any federal
analysis at all where the rights claimant prevails under the state constitution. Where a federal analysis is necessary, it is critical that, at the
very least, the state and federal analyses occupy distinct and separate
sections in the court's opinion. At the same time, modern federalism
calls for state high courts to promote the success of their efforts by
strongly encouraging litigants to abide by these principles in their own
briefing, so that the issues are framed properly, the court is supplied
with the materials it needs to jump-start and direct its research, and the
presentation of the arguments and supporting law mirrors-and, to
some extent, guides-the proper organizational structure of the finished
opinion.
i.

Order of Analysis: State Issues First, Where
Practicable

The recommended order of analysis under the modern federalism
approach-as inspired by the primacy principle, state issues first,
then, if necessary, federal issues-dramatically reduces the chances
of the state high courts muddying the waters with respect to federal
constitutional interpretation. This, in turn, reduces the temptation
for the U.S. Supreme Court to stretch the boundaries of its jurisdiction in order to correct questionable interpretations of the United
States Constitution on the part of the state courts. Justice Scalia,
writing separately in defense of the Court's grant of certiorari in a
Kansas case involving issues of both state and federal law, explained that the Court is motivated in such cases by its "solemn
responsibility ... to ensure that when courts speak in the name of
the Federal Constitution, they disregard none of its guarantees...
,,345 If the state high courts are able to dispose of constitutional
cases on state grounds before they even need to consider federal
constitutional issues, the United States Supreme Court would be
relieved of much of the pressure to act as the guarantor of the accuracy of the state courts' constitutional interpretations. 346 In this

345. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (responding to
Justice Stevens' dissent criticizing majority for granting certiorari and reviewing state high
court case that was, in Justice Stevens' opinion, supported by adequate and independent
state grounds).
346. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS
IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 70 (1989) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMM'N].
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way, the primacy principle's "desirable feature of avoiding unnecessary federal constitutional adjudications," 347 as incorporated into
the more flexible and realistic modern federalism approach, helps
to preserve the boundaries of the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction.
The modern federalism approach also accomplishes this by keeping the state and federal analyses separate, which ensures that the
basis for the state high court's decision is clear in the event that the
losing litigant petitions the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari. Modern federalism's strong recommendation that courts choosing to
conduct state constitutional analyses do so first gives the state issues a clear place in the court's opinion-literally as well as figuratively, as the state analysis should be placed in a separate section.
If the state analysis does not grant the claimant the rights he or she
seeks, the federal constitutional analysis is then conducted-again,
in a separate section. Keeping the state and federal analyses separated in this manner helps to keep the bases of the state high court's
decision clear-and any adequate and independent state grounds
thus clearly in view-in the event that a litigant seeks U.S. Supreme Court review.
The order in which state and federal constitutional issues are decided under the modern federalism approach also promotes the conservation of valuable judicial resources by ensuring that they are
expended as prudently and efficiently as possible. Like the primacy
approach, modern federalism promotes finality by ensuring that, to
the extent possible, cases are decided on non-federal grounds-and,
therefore, without the possibility of review by the United States Supreme Court-the first time the state high court hears them. 348 Ensuring that the state courts try their best to focus upon the adjudication of state issues prevents them from wasting their resources
adjudicating federal constitutional issues that are not necessary to
resolve the case, reduces the size of the U.S. Supreme Court's
bloated docket, 349 and forecloses the possibility of the state courts
having to decide the same cases a second time. 350 Litigants as well

347. State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 821 (Iowa 2013).
348. Shaw, supra note 319, at 1027 (discussing the economy benefits of the primacy approach).
349. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 346, at 70.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 275-276 (calculating a rough estimate of two
years spent by U.S. Supreme Court and state high courts on remand rendering decisions that
would have been unnecessary if the state high court's judgment had been permitted to stand
on independent state grounds).
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as courts are likewise spared the need to expend valuable time and
351
resources obtaining a final judgment.
ii.

Encourage State ConstitutionalAnalysis in
Litigants'Briefing

State courts wishing to implement the modern federalism approach can solve these problems by directing litigants to analyze
state constitutional issues in their briefing. Because modern federalism favors an initial analysis of the state constitutional issues
when feasible, it rests upon the foundational assumption that the
parties will have also analyzed the state constitutional issues. After all, the court will require information upon which to base its own
analysis; the more of its limited time and resources the court will
be required to devote to this task in the absence of proper briefing,
the less likely the analysis is to be conducted. The Utah Supreme
Court lamented this problem in Brigham City v. Stuart (Brigham
City 1), which was eventually reversed and remanded when the
United States Supreme Court asserted jurisdiction in absence of obvious state grounds for decision. 352 The Utah Supreme Court explained:
Because we are resolute in our refusal to take up constitutional
issues which have not been properly preserved, framed and
briefed, we are once again foreclosed from undertaking a principled exploration of the interplay between federal and state
protections of individual rights without the collaboration of the
parties to an appeal. This collaborative effort should be re353
newed.
Instead of expecting courts to assume these burdens on their
own-a proposition that is unlikely to be effective-the courts
should instead impose an external obligation to research and argue
state constitutional issues onto the litigants, whose briefs would
then guide the courts' analysis of the issues as well as the overall
structure of the opinion. This, in turn, would promote the courts'
ability to maintain the consistency in their approach to research,
351. Shaw, supra note 319, at 1027; see also, e.g., Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567
N.E.2d 1270, 1278-79 (N.Y. 1991) ("In view of the costly, sizable record already amassed,
including hundreds of pages of briefs, no purpose is served by compelling these parties, on
this record and these briefs, to consider another trip to Washington .... ").
352. See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 408-09 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring).
353. Brigham City v. Stuart, 122 P.3d 506, 510-11 (Utah 2005), rev'd and remanded sub
nom. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
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legal analysis, and opinion writing that the successful and continued adoption of modern federalism requires.
The recommended framework under modern federalism is a simple one. A litigant's state constitutional analysis: (1) should be conducted first, before its federal-law analysis; (2) should be set off in
a separate section in the brief; and (3) should provide the information the court deems necessary to conduct its own thorough state
constitutional analysis. As to the third factor, the court should
specify in a precedential opinion the substantive information it requires in order to formulate such an analysis. For example, it might
request (a) the text of the provision at issue, (b) citations to its own
case law interpreting the provision, (c) persuasive authority from
other states interpreting similar provisions, and (d) any historical
background information and policy considerations that it should
consider in order to ensure that its analysis blends seamlessly into
its existing body of jurisprudence and is consistent with the values
354
and policy of the state.
State high courts have taken similar steps to guide litigants'
briefing before. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example,
acknowledged the importance of the litigants' briefing as the starting point of the courts' constitutional analysis in Commonwealth v.
Edmunds,355 where the court, reiterating that "it is both important
and necessary that we undertake an independent analysis of the
Pennsylvania Constitution," set forth a protocol for briefing and arguing state constitutional issues. 356 The court declared that "the
following four factors are to be briefed and analyzed by litigants in
each case hereafter implicating a provision of the Pennsylvania constitution": the constitutional text, the provision's history, other
states' case law on the topic, and policy considerations that take
state and local implications into account. 357 Judge Thomas Hardiman of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has observed that "it is already clear that Edmunds profoundly affected Pennsylvania jurisprudence by establishing a framework for
lawyers and courts to demonstrate that they have engaged in a
'35
state constitutional analysis . 8
354. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894-95 (Pa. 1991) (setting forth
similar factors).
355. 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
356. Id. at 894-95.
357. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court enumerated the Edmunds factors as a direct
response to Michigan u.Long's plain statement rule. Id. at 895; see also Commonwealth v.
Russo, 934 A.2d 1199, 1208 n.l (Pa. 2007) (recognizing Long as the Edmunds Court's motivation).
358. Hardiman, supra note 344, at 523.
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Other state high courts should follow the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's example and institute a protocol like the one recommended
above in order to direct litigants to set forth their analyses of state
statutory and constitutional claims before-and separate fromtheir analyses of federal constitutional claims in their briefs, as well
as to provide the information the court needs to conduct its own
analysis. Requesting that the litigants brief their claims in accordance with the modern federalism approach is likely to increase the
state high courts' eventual compliance with it, as there is a greater
incentive for litigants to follow such a procedure than the courts
themselves. The Edmunds protocol, for example, plays an important role as an external motivating force in that it "strongly encourages that the litigants provide the Court with the appropriate
information to reach a reasoned decision on an independent claim
under the Pennsylvania Constitution. '3 59
By conducting an organized, thorough, and, therefore, more persuasive analysis of their state constitutional arguments, as well as
demonstrating good faith toward the court by complying with the
stated framework and providing the materials the court needs to
begin its research, litigants put themselves in a better position to
win the case. Following the court's direction gives the court a favorable impression of the litigant and, conversely and more importantly, avoids giving the court an unfavorable impression. It
also serves as a mechanism by which litigants can highlight statelaw arguments that favor their claims, particularly in situations
where the corresponding federal precedent is unfavorable. There
will, of course, be litigants who will forgo this opportunity to conduct a proper state constitutional analysis in accordance with the
court's stated framework, perhaps due to their discomfort with
state constitutional law or in the hope of saving time and resources.
Because the use of the framework is "strongly encouraged," the subtext under these circumstances is clear: litigants who deviate from
the court's preferred format may not be maximizing their chances
of winning. 360 This is, perhaps, an even more powerful incentive for
litigants to follow the recommended procedure.

359. Russo, 934 A.2d at 1218 (Baldwin, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
360. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not feel compelled to impose waiver as a consequence of failure to brief in accordance with Edmunds; however, it did "reaffirm [Edmunds'] importance and encourage its use." Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa.
1995). Interestingly, then-Chief Judge Durham, a proponent of new federalism, implied that
a fear of a hard-line waiver rule that would unfairly penalize litigants led her to reject the
notion that a briefing procedure like the Edmunds framework should be adopted in Utah.
See State v. Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106, 1115 n.6 (Utah 2007).
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This is not to say, however, that litigants should be coerced into
adhering to the court's preferred format. Constitutional arguments
should not be deemed waived merely because they do not follow the
prescribed order or discuss all of the topics enumerated in Edmunds. Like Pennsylvania's reasonable, moderate approach to the
Edmunds framework, which serves as a "rule for litigants to follow
and a guidepost for courts in interpreting state constitutional provisions," 36 1 the framework proposed under modern federalism need
not be feared as overly draconian toward litigants or too demanding
on the limited resources of courts. As the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has made clear in its subsequent treatment of Edmunds,
waiver of state constitutional issues where litigants fail to brief
them properly is an overly harsh-and therefore inappropriatepenalty. 36 2 Nor are the courts automatically burdened in the event
that litigants fail to adhere to the framework. Because Edmunds
was directed "to litigants, not to courts," a court can decline to perform its analysis in accordance with the framework when it lacks
the "raw materials" to do so due to inadequate briefing.363
Even on occasions where litigants fail to follow this structure,
state high courts should make the effort to follow the modern federalism approach of their own accord. Although the task of rigorously adhering to a prescribed analytical framework can be a diffi36 4
cult one, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has acknowledged,
that court has demonstrated that it is possible.36 5 Not only is such
an approach possible, it is desirable, given the additional benefits
the state high courts stand to reap by adopting modern federalism

361. Hardiman, supra note 344, at 519.
362. See White, 669 A.2d at 899 (defendant did not waive a constitutional claim that was
raised but not briefed in accordance with Edmunds).
363. Hardiman, supra note 344, at 518-19 (emphasis in original).
364. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has admitted to some inconsistency in conforming
its own analyses of Pennsylvania Constitutional issues to the structure set forth in Edmunds.
See Russo, 934 A.2d at 1208 n.11. In Russo, dissenting Justice Baldwin argued that the
majority was criticizing itself too harshly. See id. at 1218 (Baldwin, J., dissenting) ("If, by
'ignored the Edmunds paradigm,' the Majority means to say that there was no explicit analysis of each of the Edmunds factors, that is correct; however, if the Majority means that the
Court failed to conduct an appropriate analysis of the history and state-specific reasons for a
decision departing from federal standards, as they believe is required by Edmunds, that assumption is incorrect.").
365. See id. at 1208 n. 11 (majority opinion) (noting, despite the Court's occasional inconsistency in its application of the Edmunds framework, "there also are numerous, careful state
constitutional decisions where this Court has engaged in the responsible, searching inquiry
Edmunds outlined."); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 738 A.2d 427, 430 (Pa. 1999)
(applying Edmunds in assessing the validity under the Pennsylvania Constitution of the
criminal defendant's consent to a search); Commonwealth v. Williams, 692 A.2d 1031, 1038
(Pa. 1997) (applying Edmunds to determine the constitutional validity of the search of a parolee).
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as their approach to constitutional analysis. The modern federalism approach empowers state courts to safeguard their authority to
decide state-law issues 366 and to build the body of state constitutional precedent that forms the adequate and independent state
grounds for decision that ultimately shield the state courts' decisions from being reviewed-and possibly overturned-by the
367
United States Supreme Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court also stands to benefit from the states'
adoption of modern federalism, which mitigates the problems that
arose in the past when the Court adopted a "hands-off' approach,
presuming a lack of jurisdiction and declining to review state high
court cases. Because the modern federalism approach discourages
state high courts from conducting any federal analysis at all if the
state analysis is sufficient to decide the case, the state courts can
be expected to wade into federal territory less frequently. Opinions
constructed in accordance with modern federalism keep the state
and federal constitutional analyses separate from one another, clarifying the respective bodies of law and minimizing confusion on the
part of the U.S. Supreme Court as to the grounds upon which the
decision rests in the event that review is sought. The modern federalism approach also minimizes any temptation on the Court's
part to exceed its jurisdiction-and helps it to avoid being criticized
for its exercise thereof.368
In these ways, the modern federalism approach helps to preserve
comity and promote the overall health of the federal system. It
helps the state and federal judges to save face, as the number of
opportunities for the U.S. Supreme Court to critique the state
courts' application of federal law or admonish them for failing to

366. See Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L.
REV. 165, 178 (1984) ("My own view has long been that a state court always is responsible
for the law of its state before deciding whether the state falls short of a national standard, so
that no federal issue is properly reached when the state's law protects the claimed right.").
367. See State v. Briggs, 199 P.3d 935, 948-49 (Utah 2008) (Durham, C., concurring).
Then-Chief Justice Durham implored her colleagues on the Utah Supreme Court to conduct
their own state law analysis when necessary to adhere to the primacy approach (from which
modern federalism's order of analysis derives its inspiration):
The failure to undertake independent state analysis in cases where state law is argued
contributes to a paucity of precedent and the absence of an independent and adequate
state ground for our holding. This result is occasionally thrust upon us by parties who
fail to raise state constitutional questions, but I think it is unfortunate when we embrace it ourselves.
Id. at 949 (internal citations omitted).
368. It is still appropriate for the U.S. Supreme Court to take jurisdiction where the state
high court's purported "state constitutional analysis" consists of a mere fleeting reference, or
where the state court's opinion is tied directly to the Court's interpretation of the federal
constitution (for example, if the state employs the lockstep approach).
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make the grounds for their decisions sufficiently clear is greatly reduced. Relatedly and even more importantly, the modern federalism approach maintains the proper balance between federal and
state authority that forms the very foundation of the American system of government. The Iowa Supreme Court has pointed out that
increased emphasis on independent state constitutional law, which
modern federalism encourages, promotes "a constitutional dialogue
between state and federal courts" as they conduct parallel constitutional analyses. 36 9 This, the Court reassures us, is "highly desirable
and should cause celebration, not handwringing," as this type of dialogue "demonstrate[s] that the system of dual sovereignty is now
functioning more closely to the federalist ideal." 370 In this way,
modern federalism helps to ensure that the structure the Founding
Fathers envisioned continues to flourish. In the words of James
Madison:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered
by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among
distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security
arises to the rights of the people. The different governments
will control each other, at the same time that each will be con371
trolled by itself.
The modern federalism approach-coupled with judicial restraint
toward state high court opinions on the part of the United States
Supreme Court-optimizes the sovereign courts' ability to do just
that.

369.

State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 818 (Iowa 2013) (citing JAMES A. GARDNER,

INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM

100 (2005)). The Iowa Supreme Court also endorsed the benefits of the increased attention
to state constitutional interpretation that Professor Gardner identified:
[S]tate court rejection of United States Supreme Court decisions under state constitutions can ultimately influence opinion on the correctness of the Supreme Court decision, contribute to a state-level nationwide consensus, sometimes considered by the
United States Supreme Court, provide a check on national power by prohibiting state
and local governments from exercising power granted to them under the United States
Constitution, and curb harm to civil liberties brought about by narrow United States
Supreme Court rulings.
Id. (citing James A. Gardner, State ConstitutionalRights as Resistance to National Power,
91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1032-54 (2003)).
370. Id. at 820.
371.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The Michigan v. Long presumption has proven problematic
throughout its thirty-plus-year existence. Even if one is to assume
arguendo that Long has effectuated its stated purpose of promoting
the uniformity of federal law, more than thirty years of subsequent
jurisprudence have made clear that the Court's pursuit of uniformity has come at a cost. Long's presumption of federal grounds
for decision in state high court cases involving a mix of state and
federal grounds has placed the adequate and independent state
grounds doctrine in jeopardy by thwarting its most valuable benefits: comity, jurisdiction, and judicial economy. This state of affairs
disrespects the state courts' sovereignty, wastes the time and resources of the courts and litigants, and turns the U.S. Supreme
Court's opinions into mere academic exercises. These failings lead
to one inexorable conclusion: it is time for the Court to abandon
Long.
Instead, the United States Supreme Court should return to its
earliest approach to ambiguously grounded cases and presume that
the decision rests on state grounds. This presumption is more efficient because declining review prevents both the U.S. Supreme
Court and the state court from having to re-decide the case. It offers
the additional benefit of promoting comity between the state high
courts and the U.S. Supreme Court-also promoting, in turn, the
healthy functioning of the federal system and safeguarding the authority of the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court.
This approach is consistent with the Court's historical approach to
its own jurisdiction and reinforces its role vis-A-vis its sovereign
state counterparts by respecting the bounds set by the U.S. Constitution.
The abandonment of Long need not mark a return to laissez-faire
treatment of state high court cases, which increases the risk of eroding the uniformity of federal law if state high courts' errant federal
analyses remain unreviewed and uncorrected. In order to mitigate
this possibility in the post-Long era, the U.S. Supreme Court should
insert a disclaimer into its denials of certiorari stating that the state
high court's decision rested on adequate and independent state
grounds and thus carries no precedential value with respect to any
federal constitutional analysis contained therein. Far from serving
as a rebuke to the state courts, the disclaimer simply reminds litigants or courts relying on the case of a traditional federalism con-
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cept: the state high courts are the ultimate arbiters of their respective state laws, while the U.S. Supreme Court has ultimate authority over the interpretation of federal law.
The state high courts can buttress the U.S. Supreme Court's effort by incorporating the modern federalism approach into their
state constitutional jurisprudence. Modern federalism encourages
state high courts to make a reasonable, good-faith effort to conduct
a thorough, independent state constitutional analysis before moving on to any federal analysis; performing a federal analysis only
where the rights claimant is not entitled to additional protection
under state law; and locating the state and federal bases for their
decisions in separate sections in their opinions. By making diligent
efforts to separate their state and federal grounds for decision, the
state high courts can prevent cases from being deemed "ambiguously grounded" in the first place and thus and reduce the likelihood
of the U.S. Supreme Court stretching its own jurisdiction into impermissible territory. Resolving the state constitutional issues first
also contributes to the development of a solid body of state constitutional precedent while discouraging state courts from engaging in
unnecessary forays into federal law-in turn removing any temptation for the U.S. Supreme Court to involve itself and allowing state
law to continue to evolve independent of Supreme Court review.
In order to fully realize these benefits, the state high courts
should devise a framework based on the modern federalism approach and strongly encourage litigants to follow it in their briefing.
This incentivizes litigants to adequately raise, argue, and support
the relevant constitutional issues and provides courts with the
structure and "raw materials" necessary to guide and streamline
their opinion-writing processes. For a state high court to formally
adopt such a modern federalism framework and encourage litigants
to follow it ensures that the approach continues in perpetuity as the
state's citizens elect new judges to the bench.
Taken together, the abandonment of Long and its replacement
with the presumption of adequate and independent state grounds
and an accompanying disclaimer, complemented by the states'
adoption of the modern federalism approach, respect both the sovereignty of the states and the supremacy of federal law. These proposed solutions to the Long problem are, therefore, well-suited to
effectuate Justice Stevens' deeply held and often-repeated belief
"that a policy of judicial restraint-one that allows other decisional
bodies to have the last word in legal interpretation until it is truly
necessary for this Court to intervene-enables this Court to make
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its most effective contribution to our federal system of govern372
ment."

372. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1067 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 409 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting the
Justice's own dissent in Long).

